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Starting from the late 1990s the literature on investment attractiveness has been 
widely renewed by focusing on the role of the quality of domestic institutions as one of the 
key factors explaining the inequality in investment levels among countries (see Kraay and 
Zoido-Lobatón 1999, Agnès Bénassy-Quéré et al. 2005). From the one side the rule of law, 
government effectiveness, efficient enforcement of property rights and contracts as well as 
the legal system in general and from the other side the proper operation of informal 
networks, low level of corruption and political risks have been specifically demonstrated to 
be associated with higher investment levels. 
Another important fact about investments this study refers to is that the productivity 
of the investments on the host country’s economy is significantly influenced by the country 
of origin of the investments (Fortanier 2007). The characteristics of the investors acquired 
in some specific country decides the form of FDI particularly whether or not the 
investments tend to concentrations in the host country’s economy, which has a negative 
effect on the host economy (Mathis 2005) particularly on transition economies (Mencinger 
2003). These negative effects also negatively influence the attractiveness of the country as 
an environment for foreign investment and hinder the level of investments to the very 
economy. 
This study is concentrated on Armenia’s case and tries to demonstrate the real 
investment climate in the country which is in an acute contradiction with the officially 
presenting characteristics. Though the official position of Armenian government towards 
foreign investment seems completely sufficient in reality the aspects stated officially are 
implemented not efficiently, with major gaps and failures or are not implemented at all.  
“The concept of Investment policy of RA” (Government of Armenia 2005) expressing the 
general approaches and strategy of investment policy of Armenia notes the significant role 
of investment and particularly foreign investment for Armenian economy and as a way for 
rising the country’s attractiveness for a foreign investors in the line with other factors 
importance is also given to the institutional quality with a focus on the enforcement of the 
rights of investors and investments. This means that Armenia officially supports the idea of 
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foreign investment and would like to have investment inflows to the country, however, to 
what rules of the market - mostly unofficial - these investments should follow and how it 
affects the level of investments and attractiveness of Armenian investment market is of 
much discussion that this study refers to.  
Indeed, the recent data from the National Statistical Service of Armenia (NSS) 
indicates that the foreign direct investment (FDI) in the Armenian economy has 
demonstrated a sharp decrease in 2013 for a second consecutive year (Ministry of Economy 
of Armenia 2013). The data shows that the FDI in Armenia during 2013 was just over $271 
million which is less by over 52 percent from that of 2012. Similarly, in 2012 the FDI 
inflows into Armenian economy were equal to nearly $567 million which is 10 percent less 
than in 2011. This declining tendency of the foreign investment in the state has started from 
2007 and though the domestic economy started slowly to emerge from the crisis starting 
from 2009, the level of FDI in Armenia has been still decreasing. Armenian governmental 
officials refer this ongoing tendency to external factors, particularly the slow economic 
growth of developed countries.  
However, the politicians representing opposition and other independent analysts 
attributed it to the various barriers, flaws and gaps in Armenia’s business environment. The 
lack of an acting field for the majority of investors has also been stated as such factor. 
Many believe that foreign investors are not willing and in some sense are scared to act in an 
environment where the government-linked entrepreneurs enjoyed a full patronage from the 
officials. Under the control of this kind of entrepreneurs are many sectors of large-scale and 
profitable businesses. Indeed, the report made by the World Bank (WB) on November 2013 
states that de facto in Armenia monopolies control over 20 percent of economic 
performance, thus making Armenia the most monopolized economy on the post-Soviet 
space (WB 2013).            
The study is concentrated on the role of formal and informal institutions of Armenia 
in causing barriers that hinder foreign investment inflows into Armenia. Taking into 
consideration both political and economic role of Russia for Armenia the study is also 
discussing Russia’s role as an external actor that may influence the operation of those very 
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institutions. Taking into account the mentioned two research questions are formulated in 
the scope of this thesis. 
The Research Question 1 is the following: What are the barriers to investment 
market of Armenia which cannot be reflected in the macro-economic figures - particularly 
the institutional ones? This question gives a rise to the Hypothesis 1 which is the following: 
Informal networks of Armenia and governmental decisions on securing dominant positions 
of specific companies are generally acted as barriers to investment market of Armenia.  
The Research Question 2 of this thesis is formulated in the following way: What is 
Russia’s role in causing institutional barriers in Armenia’s investment market? This 
question gives a rise to the Hypothesis 2 which is the following: Russia stimulates the rise 
of the institutional barriers in the investment market of Armenia.                                                                                                                                                                    
The study will respond to these questions mostly through the transaction cost 
approach of the institutional analysis. This approach of institutionalism has been widely 
discussed particularly by Douglas North (1990) intending to concentrate on the linkage 
between the operation of institutions and transaction costs. The latter influences the 
behavior and decision making of the investor (Fazzari et al. 1988, Whited 1992, Schaller 
1993, and Faroque and Ton-That 1995) which in its turn is one of the decisive factors 
determining the investment levels. The analysis of the hypothesis will be based on the case 
studies of the 3 sectors of Armenian economy.  
 Another perspective of proving the hypothesis is the analysis of the primary data 
acquired through the interviews which have been conducted with Armenian politicians 
(political analysts) and economists. The outcome of the interviews is further elaborated and 
analyzed with a correspondence to the research questions and hypothesis of this study. The 
analysis of the interviews has been mostly focused on the Hypothesis 2 that is on Russia’s 
role in stimulating institutional barriers to the investment market of Armenia.  
The study shows that the informal institutions, particularly the powerful informal 
networks acting in Armenia influence the investment market of the country, create an 
environment where the investors are obliged to hold the interests of these informal 
networks particularly through corruption practices, which increase their transaction costs. 
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The study also finds that there are formal institutions, particularly governmental acts that 
are acting as barriers to investment climate of Armenia. 
The study shows that Russian investments tend to concentrate and monopolize 
Armenian market through the levers concentrated on Russia’s hands. The concentration of 
the economic environment leads to a situation where the investors need to spend additional 
resources to get access to the market or for continuation of their activities in the market. 
This again leads to the increase in transaction costs. As throughout the literature review it is 
demonstrated that higher transaction costs lead to the decrease in investment levels, the 
study finds that both Russia and informal networks arise barriers for foreign investment 
inflows to Armenia, thus negatively affecting the investment climate of Armenia. 
This research benefits the literature in several ways. It is of high importance to 
mention that Armenian literature and literature in general lack to provide similar researches 
that is a comprehensive study of institutional gaps and their role in Armenia’s attractiveness 
as an investment market. Although various articles, reports – especially by international 
organizations – and media publications wrote about those institutional failures, these gaps 
and failures are as a rule used to demonstrate the violations in the work of this or that 
officials and criticize the weak rule of law in the country and rarely link it to the behavior 
and decision making process of the investor and entrepreneur.  
The existence of this kind of study rise awareness about Armenian investment 
market and can be a good supplement for any investor, especially for the ones who have 
little or no knowledge about this market. There is a significant need to make the findings of 
this research public as an alternative to official reports. What is more taking into account 
today’s strict pro-Russian attitude of the Armenian Government it is doubtful whether or 
not the official reports reflect Russia’s negative effects on Armenian economy.  
Other than the mentioned this research may indirectly benefit the literature in the 
scope of today’s one of the most discussed topics in Armenia, that is the inclusion of 
Armenia to the de facto Russian-dominated Customs Union. The findings about Russia’s 
role in the operation of institutions of Armenia may be of high importance if further 
elaborated in a right way.                                                                                                                                                      
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The thesis is organized as follows. Firstly will be demonstrated the background 
where the institutional background of investment market of Armenia is characterized. In the 
next section will be demonstrated the theoretical basement of the research, the review of 
existing literature related to this study, and the methodology of the analysis. The following 
section will present the case studies and analysis of 3 sectors of Armenian economy. The 
answers to questionnaire are conceptualized and discussed in the next section named – 




























Armenia in the past 23 years has had, has, and in the foreseeable future will 
probably have the major problems hindering faster economic growth, the level and quality 
of life, which, undoubtedly, affects the investment environment in the country. These 
problems are both objective and subjective. The objective is low capacity of the economy, 
shortage of resources and, ultimately, the history of Armenia. Subjective ones are of 
exogenous nature, that is, the causes and issues that do not depend on officials, but which, 
nevertheless, has to be considered.  
Fear of risk is a result of ineffective activities over the past all the years of 
independence, when Armenians in a wide sense failed to create an effective state. However, 
effective state in the comprehensive sense of the term, in the sense of creating institutions 
of economic regulatory institutions effective equalization of incomes of the population, 
institutions, creating a system of protection of rights and freedoms of citizens, institutions, 
providing feedback in the process of democracy, had to provide the best results of the 
formation of power structures, based on checks and balances based on constitutional values. 
Here should be added the lack of work in terms of international cooperation, particularly 
weak integration into the world economy and political processes.  
The government of Armenia, by and large, has done and continue to do errors that 
accumulate and cumulative continue to create new quality problems, which, in principle, 
could not be. If there was an effective government, already achieved a high level of life, 
mastering high technologies and was more or less competitive economy, the solution of the 
question on attraction of investments would be easily undertaken. All of the mentioned has 
lead to an environment which is reflected in the rankings and reports made by different 
international organizations. 
The Index of Economic Freedom 2014 (The Heritage Foundation 2014) gave a 68.9 
score to Armenia thus naming Armenia as “moderately free” and ranking as the 41st freest 
among 186 countries (For the methodology of the index see Appendix 1). The report about 
Armenia indicates that the overall score comparing to the previous year has declined by 0.5 
point mostly due to “combined deteriorations in investment freedom, business freedom, and 
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fiscal freedom”.  According to the Index of Economic Freedom 2014 some aspects have 
improved their scores (Labor Freedom, Monetary Freedom) while the others have worsen 
or demonstrated no change. Particularly, Business Freedom, Investment Freedom, 
Government Spending and Fiscal Freedom have worsened their positions comparing to the 
year 2013.  
The report points out that the bureaucratic barriers and non-transparent regulations 
are the main factors that restrain foreign investment. What is more, if believing the report, 
significant challenges still exist, specifically in implementing deeper institutional and 
systemic reforms, which have a crucial role in strengthening the bases of economic 
freedom. Moreover, the Index indicates the weak legal framework of Armenia, high level 
of corruption and low level of protection of property rights. Particularly, the corruption 
covers such important areas in Armenia as tax and customs operations and law 
enforcement. The report notes that it is mostly common to face with a petty corruption and 
that anti-corruption regulations have not been enforced properly which leads to weak rule 
of law and poor protection of intellectual property rights.  
The 2013 Corruption Perception Index (Transparency International 2013) presented 
by the Transparency International (For the methodology of the index see Appendix 2) gave 
score 36 to Armenia thus ranking Armenia 94th (in the line with Algeria, Djibouti, 
Suriname and others ) among 177 countries in terms of corruption level. Although Armenia 
has improved its position slightly since 2012 and got some better scores for 2013, it is still 
considered as highly corrupted country with a corrupted business environment which 
hardly can be attractive for a foreign investor.  
Another ranking called Freedom in the World 2013 (Freedom House 2013) 
introduced by the Freedom House gave a “Partly Free” status with a Freedom Rating of 4.5 
to Armenia in a wide sense in terms of “Political Rights” and “Civil Liberties” (For the 
methodology of the index see Appendix 3). In the report on Armenia the research, here 
again pointed out the widespread corruption practices, bribery and nepotism which are also 
common among the government officials, who however, are rarely prosecuted or removed 




The report underlines that in Armenia “The judiciary is subject to political pressure 
from the executive branch and suffers from considerable corruption”. Although it is legally 
allowed to own a business in Armenia the report make a focus on factors hindering 
business activities, particularly the corrupted and inefficient court system, and what is not 
less important the unfair competition in the business environment. As stated, the main 
industries are in the hands of a group of entrepreneurs better known in the society as 
oligarchs who as a rule have received preferential treatment during the early periods of 
privatization. Illegal expropriation of private property by the state is also one of the 
problems hindering business activity in the country.  
Another important factor that the report of the Freedom House writes about is the 
press freedom. The freedom of press in general is a significant contributor for investor. 
During the market research and information collecting process the media may be one of the 
least resource consuming sources of information for the investor and as high is the level of 
press freedom as unbiased will be the information presented there and vice versa, meaning 
that in case of not free media environment the investor will probably spend more money for 
getting information from more reliable sources. 
All of the mentioned characterizes Armenian business environment and investment 
climate of Armenia. Some of the aspects and problems mentioned above by those 














CHAPTER 1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Classical macroeconomic studies generally describe positively the increase in the 
levels of investments for the host economy. However, these studies mostly overlook the 
institutional background of the host country of investments. Taking into account the 
institutional characteristics of Armenia demonstrated in the section of Background, 
particularly high corruption rates, state patronage, highly monopolized market, the weak 
rule of law, these characteristics can have a decisive role on the effect of for instance FDI 
on economic development of Armenia. However, a number of studies addressed 
institutions, their role in attracting investments, the effect of host country’s institutions on 
the levels of investment inflows, the role of those institutions in determining the spillover 
effects. In this sense, this study is going to observe through institutional analysis the role of 
institutions of Armenia in attracting (hindering) investment inflows given in mind already 
mentioned institutional specificity of Armenia.  
Institutions serve to constrain and guide human behavior. They are systems of 
established and embedded social rules that structure social interactions (Hodgson 2000). 
Institutions provide stability and guidelines for action which are necessary because 
individuals lack information on the current position and on alternatives and because people 
suffer from insufficient capacity to make rational choices under complex conditions. 
“Institutionalism also argues that structures (institutions) create greater regularity of human 
behavior than would otherwise exist and therefore enhance the explanatory and predictive 
capacity of the social sciences” (Peters 2000). However, a lot depends on the institutional 
approach chosen for a study or research. Further in this chapter it is demonstrated the 
theoretical base and the approach used for the analysis of this thesis. 
 
How Institutions Attract FDI and Determine Its Growth Effect 
 
The earlier studies on finding the role of institutions in attracting Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) were not that successful. The research carried out by Mody and Wheeler 
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in 1992 can be an example. With the use of the first main elements of 13 risk factors which 
in the line with corruption, the legal system and political instability contains also factors as 
inequality and the environment of expatriates which are not directly linked with the quality 
of institutions the research was carried out. The outcome was that they fail to demonstrate a 
significant impact of the quality of institutions on the location of American foreign 
affiliates.  
However, the later studies were more successful in demonstrating that institutions 
mater for FDI. A study by La Porta; Lopez-de-Silanes et al. (1998) demonstrate that 
shareholder rights, risk of repudiation of contracts by government as well as the risk of 
expropriation are significantly effecting FDI. The study by Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-
Lobatón (1999) find out that political instability and violence, rule of law, government 
effectiveness, regulatory burden and bribery are also matter for FDI. The role of political 
instability in the investment climate of the country has been studied further. Ok (2004) 
indicates political instability in the line with economic instability as the most substantial 
barrier to foreign investment. He observed a dataset obtained through a survey of managers 
and expatriates of companies who have foreign capital in Turkey (2004). The level of 
political risk also has a negative impact on the level of inward FDI of a specific country 
(Harms and Ursprung 2002).  
When discussing institutions, it should be mentioned that institutions can be both 
formal and informal (North 1990). “Informal institutions are socially shared values, usually 
unwritten, that are created, communicated and enforced outside officially sanctioned 
channels” (Helmke and Levitsky 2006, P 286), such as conventions and codes of behavior 
(North 1990). Formal institutions include judicial, economic rules, and contracts that are 
created through official channels (executive, legislative) and communicated and enforced 
by state agencies (Helmke and Levitsky 2006; North 1990). “Although formal rules may 
change overnight as the result of political or judicial decisions, informal constraints 
embodied in customs, traditions, and codes of conduct are much more impervious to 
deliberate policies” (North 1990, P6).  
One of the main differences between formal and informal institutions is that, while 
the latter are shared expectations established and enforced outside officially sanctioned 
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channels, the former are rules or procedures which are created and enforced through official 
channels (Belay Seyoum 2011). However, in both cases the violation of the rules assumes 
some form of sanctions.  
The duration of registering a business is a good example of the operation of formal 
institutions which have may cause significant barriers to investment in this or that location. 
For instance, De Soto (2000) indicates that almost 2 months is needed for registering a 
business in West Asian countries, whereas in Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) countries only half of that duration. The role of formal institutions in 
attracting investments is relatively obvious if comparing with informal institutions. The 
latter in the scope of its influence on FDI and economic growth has received limited 
attention in the literature. 
One of the studies focused on the typology of informal institutions that is 
increasingly used in the literature (Bratton 2007: Estrin and Prevezer 2010) is the study 
carried out by Helmke and Levitsky (2006).  
As stated by Bush (1987) the institutional structure of any society combines 2 
systems of value, namely the instrumental and the ceremonial. The characteristics of the 
ceremonial values include the standards of judgment through referring to traditions, 
ideologies and myths rather than to any test of refutability. In contrast to the mentioned, the 
standards of judgment of instrumental values for correlating behavior are based on tools 
and skills. They are based on the standards such as efficient cause meaning that these 
values are not immutable and they will be replaced by better standards if they lose their 
ability of problem solving (Veblen 1904). In general, both ceremonial and instrumental 
values are laid on the bases of this or that institution. A large portion of ceremonial 
dominance would point out a low level openness of the institution to technological changes 
and vice a versa if the ceremonial values are replaced by instrumental values this would 
lead to institutional progress (Adkisson 2010; Bush 1987).  
There are different reasons for emerging of informal institutions, such as the 
consequences of a specific historical experience that generates particular socially shared 
expectations. Another factor favoring the rise of informal institutions is the gaps in the 
formal institutions. Here informal institutions come to address norms procedures not 
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considered by the formal rules (Helmke and Levitsky 2006). Informal rules also may be 
established in order to circumvent the formal ones and thus to get engaged in activities that 
may be illegal.  
A mechanism of the transmission and enforcement of informal rules is personal 
networks, often operating through organizations (Belay Seyoum 2011). “Although the 
formal organization describes authority lines, much of the influence (Knoke and Burt 1983) 
and the actual work (Bums and Stalker 1961; Strauss 1962) is accomplished through the 
informal structure of friends, contacts, and accidental communications” (Krackhardt and 
Stern 1988) that form these personal networks or informal networks which in their turn are 
considered as informal institutions. These informal networks have a decisive and vital role 
in the investment climate of Armenia. As stated earlier the main industries are in the hands 
of a group of entrepreneurs better known in the society as oligarchs who as a rule have 
received preferential treatment during the early periods of privatization. These oligarchs 
among who are also high level officials constitute the strongest networks the goal of which 
is to follow the common interests with the use of the levers concentrated in their hands. The 
function of these informal networks will be further elaborated and discussed in the section 
of Case Studies of this research. 
Another interesting argument is demonstrated by Stiglitz (1999) who indicates that 
institutional failures are restraining the supply response of many developing countries thus 
decreasing their absorptive capacity for investment. Taking this argument into account 
Belay Seyoum (2011) mentions that that is why it is important to strengthen not only 
formal institutions but to put an emphasis on informal institutions as well, such as trust and 
reputation. In high trust societies, trust increases impersonal market exchanges, reduces the 
need for external enforcement, which in its turn gives a rise to the gains from specialization 
and international division of labor (Keefer and Knack 1997; Putnam 1993).  
Seyoum (2011) indicates several reasons why the countries with informal 
institutions which are based on high level of trust and reputation are likely to attract FDI. 
He notes that reliable informal networks in general provide efficient mechanisms for 
contract enforcement with both suppliers and customers; they provide reliable information 
which may be vital in making business decisions and also reliable informal networks 
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decrease overall transaction costs by decreasing the cost of information, screening and 
monitoring potential partners and suppliers.  
Seyoum (2011) also adds that although informal institutions may have particular 
ceremonial implications like enhancing someone’s social status in the community, they also 
may demonstrate the instrumental function of decreasing transaction costs and providing 
effective mechanisms of contract enforcement. In the study made by Bernstein (1996) it is 
demonstrated that American merchants usually prefer to solve their disputes without 
referring to the expensive legal system of the country.  
Kerr (2010) explains about the business climate of the Middle East as an 
environment with one largely based on trust and reputation and many challenges faced by 
foreign companies in navigating complex political systems, patronage networks and unclear 
legal environments. Much of the behavior in the market that is related to giving preference 
to this or that market is conditioned by reputational concerns (List 2006). Business partners 
follow their commitments as they want to secure their reputation and get involved in future 
business interactions. A lot of contracts in the business world have many gaps and 
incompleteness however business partners tend to follow the initial agreements as their 
reputation is valuable. “Reputation is an intangible asset and a significant source indicating 
the firm’s competitiveness” (Seyoum 2011).    
There are different reasons why the quality of institutions may have a role in 
attracting FDI (Agnès Bénassy-Quéré et al. 2005). One of the reasons is that poor 
institutions may yield extra costs to FDI. The case of corruption can be considered as an 
example (Wei, 2000). Another reason is that the rise of productivity prospects may attract 
foreign investors (Agnès Bénassy-Quéré et al. 2005). The next reason is that FDI is 
specifically sensitive to any form of uncertainty, including uncertainty stemming from poor 
government efficiency, policy reversals, graft or weak enforcement of property rights and 
of the legal system in general (Agnès Bénassy-Quéré et al. 2005). What is more, one of the 
early studies on the institutions (Krueger 1974) states that when the quality of institutions is 
low, the legal system also works with low effectiveness and in such situations the 
regulatory burden in the hands of bureaucrats operates as revenue seeking tool acting 
through red tape and other harassment tools. In this sense, corruption is a main element of 
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the regulatory burden of bureaucrats who are collecting bribes and producers or consumers 
who are paying bribes. In the first case it works as a rent collecting device, while in the case 
of paying bribes it is considered as a device to limit or bypass the regulatory burden 
(Philippe Kohler 2010).                                                                                                                                                                                 
Another perspective of institutional determinants of FDI is the democratization 
process. There is no single view on the role of democratization in the FDI inflows. The later 
studies on the topic that came to replace the unclear outcomes of the ones before – 
particularly by Li and Resnick (2003) – mostly show that democratic institutions have 
positive effect on FDI (Kolstad and Tondel 2002; North and Weingast 1989; Harms and 
Ursprung 2002). However, Doytch and Eren (2012) indicate that the democratization 
process can also have a negative effect on FDI, since foreign investors may be in position 
to receive better incentives from autocratic regimes than from democracies (Doytch and 
Eren  2012, P.3). Also Asiedu and Lien (2011) argue that democratization has positive 
impact on FDI in states where the proportion of natural resources in total exports is 
relatively low and has negative impact on FDI in states where the proportion of natural 
resources in total exports is high.                                                                                                                                                                          
Since the corruption is a sign of unfavorable institutional environment (Doytch and 
Eren 2012, P4), the effect of corruption on FDI has been also widely studied in the scope of 
institutional determinants of investment. However, the situation here is very much alike as 
with the democratization process, in the sense that the researches carried out through the 
time have led to 3 different outcomes. That is, some studies indicate no significant 
relationship between corruption and FDI inflows (Akcay 2001), others indicate a 
significantly negative impact of corruption on FDI (Stein and Daude 2001; Habib and 
Zurawicki 2001; Smarzynska and Wei 2000). Moreover, there are studies that prove that 
corruption can be also an inducement for FDI (Egger and Winner 2003, 2005). In their 
study Doytch and Eren (2012) explain this kind of outcome with the opportunity to 
circumvent regulatory and administrative restrictions, and what is more they highlight the 
fact that in low-income countries these are used frequently in order to allow government 
officials to share in the profits that come from foreign investment.  
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The operation and functioning of institutions along with other factors design the 
investment climate of a specific country. Investment climate has also been analyzed in the 
framework of its attractiveness for FDI. Kinda (2010) detected that constraints which are 
linked to the investment climate including institutional and physical infrastructure problems 
as well as financing constraints are barriers for FDI. What is more, the same study noted 
that the firms that supply the domestic market are less constrained in their functioning by 
physical infrastructure barriers than the foreign firms.  
Veganzones-Varoudakis and Sekkat (2007) evaluate the impact of openness and 
investment climate on FDI. The outcome of this research is that infrastructure availability 
as well as solid political and economic conditions raises the attractiveness of developing 
countries for foreign investors. One of the few studies on the sector-level analysis of FDI 
with a focus on sector of services is handled by Golub (2009). Based on the indices of 
barriers to operational restrictions on foreign firms and foreign ownership, the study notes 
that the most restricted sectors of industry are the sectors which are related to national 
sovereignty considerations and national security. Telecommunications, electricity, 
transportation and finance are considered as such. However, this statement has little to do 
with Armenia, where the mentioned sectors are fully or partly owned by foreign companies 
or given to foreign firms on the bases of a long term concession management. Thus, the 
claim made by Golub (2009) can be arguable in the sense that the mentioned sectors may 
not be that restricted to foreign firms if the sovereignty of the host country is under question 
or the sovereignty of the country has already been violated and/or the guest company is a 
state-owned company representing a country which has different levers with the use of 
which can have a solid pressure on the host country. These all mentioned is further studied 
in the scope of Armenia – Russia relationship. 
Generally, policies rely on the idea that FDI leads to the economic development of 
the host country. However, there is a weak empirical evidence for the positive impact of 
FDI on economic growth leading to the conclusion that the FDI effect is determined by the 
local conditions such as education level of the country, financial markets, etc. (Alfaro et al., 
2009). Some studies find that FDI causes economic growth, while others find that there is 
no such effect, moreover, in some cases the effect can be negative. Furthermore, 
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differences in the host country also matter in a way that the investment, trade and 
competition policies of the host country play a key role in the effect of FDI on the growth 
(Moran et al. 2005). Also with regard to transition countries, the relationship between FDI 
and economic growth is not significant for the sample of transition economies (Lyroudi et 
al., 2010). 
To continue the discussion of the local conditions of the host country, it can be 
argued that beyond the purely macroeconomic factors such as openness, inflation, GDP 
growth and real effective exchange rate, institutional and development factors can also be 
important for generating the positive effect of FDI on the growth. In this regard, 
institutional development factors include legal system efficiency, judicial independence, 
infrastructure quality, etc. (Walsh and Yu, 2010).  
Moura and Forte (2010) review theoretical and empirical studies, and find that the 
impact of FDI on growth depends on the internal conditions of the host country. These 
conditions can be economic, political, social, cultural, etc. Macroeconomic theory suggests 
that FDI can increase the economic growth through capital accumulation and total factor 
productivity. More specifically, FDI increases the stock of knowledge, and once the 
knowledge spreads over, the factor productivity rises. Furthermore, FDI contributes to the 
increasing competition, formation of human resources, integration with the global 
economy, transfer of technologies, firms’ development and restructuring, and difficulty of 
the implementation of economic policies. These factors can be regarded as channels 
through which the FDI generates growth in the host country. However, it remains unclear if 
these channels cause negative or positive effects. For instance, the effect can be negative if 
the firms transfer inappropriate technologies. Also in case of advanced technologies labour 
force has to be contracted generating unemployment in the country. What is more, FDI may 
affect imports more than exports, and as a result the balance of payments is negatively 
impacted. Increased competition, in its turn, may lead to the disappearance of the domestic 
firms, because they may be found to be weak to resist the competition. Finally, as far as it is 
extremely hard to predict the inflows of the FDI, instabilities in the economy may hinder 
the implementation of the right economic policies.      
 What stands out from the theoretical discussion above is that the absorptive 
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capability of the technologies of the host country is the most important factor in 
determining how the FDI impacts the economic growth (Borensztein, 1998). However, it is 
extremely hard to analyze the effect of FDI on the growth through this particular channel 
suggested by the macroeconomic theory for the case of Armenia, primarily, due to the data 
and information limitations caused by the government. Therefore, this study turns to the 
institutional analysis, which seems more plausible considering the current situation in 
Armenia with respect to corruption practices, monopolies and weak institutions.  
 Jude and Levieuge (2013) find that the institutional quality could determine the 
effect of FDI on growth in developing countries. The institutional quality affects the capital 
accumulation and total factor productivity, which are the channels of FDI impact on growth 
as suggested by the macroeconomic theory. In case of strong institutions the domestic firms 
can preserve their existence next to foreign firms, in other words domestic investment will 
not decline. Besides the institutional quality, the FDI effect on growth is determined by law 
enforcement, bureaucratic quality, corruption, and property rights. According to 
institutional theory, institutions set market rules and ensures the compliance of the 
economic actors with these rules. Thus, the institutional quality affects the relationship 
between the domestic and foreign firms, and the degree of the technological spillover. In 
contrast, bad institutions increase the transaction costs. Another important aspect is the 
quality of FDI. For instance, in case of weak institutions of the host country, it is more 
likely that the country will attract low-technology leaving the country without the growth 
prospects. Furthermore, weak institutional environment affects also the mode of entry in a 
way that the foreign firms may enter the domestic market through mergers and acquisitions 
leading to concentration, and again limiting the growth potential. Finally, strong institutions 
may ensure the elimination of the information asymmetries, in other words, the information 
will be transmitted to the market participants more effectively. However, if less 
transparency is involved in the system, then it becomes uncertain where the financial 
resources stemming from the FDI go. If the latter occurs, then the chances for the growth 





Country of Origin as a Factor of Foreign Investment Effect  
 
The effect of FDI on the growth of the host economy has been widely studied in the 
literature. However, the outcomes of the studies differ from research to research. While 
many researches (De Mello (1999), and Xu (2000), etc.) point out the positive effect of the 
FDI on the growth of the host country’s economy, other studies (Carkovic and Levine 
(2000), Djankov and Hoekman, (1999); Mencinger, 2003, for CEE countries etc.) indicate 
that the rise in the levels of FDI mostly negatively affect the growth.  
Fortanier (2007) argues that one of the factors that significantly affect the 
productivity of the FDI on the host economy is the country of the origin of the FDI.  The 
influence of the country of origin on TNCs has been extensively documented, especially 
from an institutional theory perspective. The nature of the domestic market, business 
system and institutional backgrounds influences a wide range of strategic and 
organizational characteristics of transnational corporations (TNCs) (Fortanier 2007, P46).  
The theory of the country of origin of the investment will be used in this study in 
the scope of the investments that are made in Armenia by Russia. As mentioned the nature 
of the domestic market, business system and institutional backgrounds affect the 
characteristics of TNCs. This study also argues that this effect has a place to be in the case 
of firms and companies other than TNCs. The institutional background of Russia as well as 
the business market in Russia is characterized by the 2014 Index of Economic Freedom 
(The Heritage Foundation 2013). The low levels of investment freedom, financial freedom, 
business freedom, monopolized environment and property rights as well as highly 
increasing corruption levels throughout the whole economy are putting Russia in the line 
with the countries considered “mostly unfree”.  
It is argued that the characteristics of the firms acting in Russia are acquired from 
the environment where they act. For instance as the firms working in Russia in an 
environment where the monopolization of the market is one of the usual goals of each firm, 
it is believed that the kind of goal will tried to be achieved in a host country in this case in 
Armenia, if the firm invests there and tries to enlarge. And taking into account the problems 
in the institutional background of Armenia already mentioned earlier like high rates of 
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corruption and weak rule of law gives possibility for such a company to monopolize this or 
that market, meaning bringing bad practices to Armenia. 
Mathis (2005) states that “for FDI effects on competition – like trade, inward 
investment allows service providers to challenge the domestic market and stimulate 
competition. However, FDI can also lead to concentrations (mergers and acquisitions) 
which, if not addressed, can raise prices by reducing supply and holds back development” 
Mathis 2005, P 11). What is more, Mencinger indicates “that the negative relationship 
between FDI and growth in transition economies could be explained by the form of FDI, 
which had been predominantly through acquisitions rather than greenfield investments” 
(Fortanier 2007, P46). Given in mind that Armenia is considered as a transition economy 
this kind of negative effect may have a place to be there. However, it should be also 
mentioned that in Armenia the concentrations of the market are mostly realized through 
monopolization rather than acquisitions or mergers.  
It is of high importance to attract investment and to get high portion of FDI, 
however, as mentioned earlier if the entrance of the foreign firm is realized with 
acquisitions or the acting of the firm in the host economy creates monopolized environment 
the possible negative effects should be taken into consideration as well. In order to avoid 
the monopolization of the market and thus the negative effects of FDI, appropriate 
competition policies and strong enforcement of the very policies are needed. Competition 
policy is not always the priority policy, however, in the absence of competition law or in 
case of violating this law there will be no lever for the government to exercise this policy 
when it is needed (Mathis 2005).  
In Armenia the gaps in the competition law as well as the improper enforcement of 
the law has lead to a monopolized environment where the monopolies as was mentioned 
earlier are controlling the 20 percent of the economic performance of Armenia. The study is 
going to argue that the concentration of the environment in Armenia is tightly conditioned 
with the presence of entrepreneurs or so called oligarchs who may have significant 
influence on the functioning of the State Government, generally through the established 
informal networks or corruption practices. This in its turn lead to an environment where the 
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government or the officials are not motivated and in some sense are limited in improving 
the competition law or at least in proper enforcement of the existing law.  
The thesis argues that the investments coming to Armenia from Russia tend to 
concentrations of the environment and that there is a non appropriate respond from the 
government to these actions, which as this study believes are also linked with political 
incentives that are presented in Armenia – Russia relationship which will be observed 
further in the thesis. The thesis argues that these political linkages foster the increase of a 
kind of Russian investment that monopolize the market, usually through legal acts – which 
may be also an outcome of blackmail and/or pressures – thus raising new barriers for the 
new investments in the market.  
Thus, another argument of this study based on the concepts mentioned is that the 
country of origin of investment should be taken into consideration as one of the factors 
determining the positive or negative effect on the host economy, then the characteristics of 
the investments coming from that specific country should be taken into consideration 
particularly whether or not the investments tend to concentrations and monopolization of 
the host country’s economy.  
If the concentration of the market is realized as a result of state patronage through 
not proper enforcement of competition law this hinders the entries of other investors, who 
in order to get access to the market also needs patronage which is generally acquired 
through corrupt practices and which in its turn increase the transaction costs of the investor.  
 
 The Role of Transaction Costs in Attracting Investments 
 
The level of transaction costs is believed to be one of the decisive elements in the 
decision making process of the investor or entrepreneur. Furubotn and Richter (1997) argue 
that if considering various connections that get revealed during the production process, then 
the transaction costs account for 60% of the product final price. Another study carried out 
by Wallis and North (1988) assesses the transaction costs of USA economy in 1970. The 
study finds that the transaction costs account for 55% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
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 The literature has extensively discussed how the transaction costs affect investment. 
The studies by Fazzari et al. (1988), Whited (1992), Schaller (1993), and Faroque and Ton-
That (1995) specifically assess this effect. It follows from the conclusions that the 
transaction costs negatively affect the investments in particular industries of different 
countries, meaning that an increase in transaction costs will lead to decrease in the level of 
investment.            
 Benjamin and Phimister (1997) provide similar findings. They argue that the 
transaction costs constrain the market that stops working efficiently, and as a result, that the 
market failures affect investments negatively. Thus, countries where the share of 
transactions costs is high tend to have more restrictions in their credit market, which leads 
to low investment rates.          
 Maher (1997) attempts to evaluate the relationship between transaction costs and 
contracts in a given environment. The author finds out that in the sense of decreasing 
transaction costs, the market  provides the best mode of governance. Hence, the 
opportunism, which is the primary transaction cost, is mitigated (Maher 1997). Although 
here a different approach has been used, the outcome of the research again suggests that the 
low level of transaction costs stimulates higher level of investments, where the opposite is 
also true.           
 Dunning (1994) states that during the 90s, the companies in various countries 
implemented a number of structural changes for the purpose of attracting more FDI. These 
structural changes imply the implementation of extensive privatization programs that aim at 
contracting the bureaucracy and expanding the market of goods and services. The 
mentioned changes finished with promoting the reduction of transaction costs. As Dunning 
(1994) states, those changes would enable more capital flows.     
 However, there are also a few studies (Macaulay 1963, 1985) which state the non 
significance of the transaction costs for the investment levels and for the economy as a 
whole. In order to clarify this, Williamson (1985) points out the fact that the investments 
are being affected only by those transaction costs that are peculiar to the given sectors of 
the economy. Otherwise, the market functions efficiently.     
 Due to the findings of the literature, this study believes that the role of transaction 
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costs does not have to be underestimated, and as mentioned earlier the transaction costs will 
be considered as factor affecting the decision making process of the investor, thus stating 
that high transaction costs affect the investment climate of a country negatively, whereas 
the low level of transaction costs has a positive influence on the investment climate of a 
country. 
 
Transaction Cost Approach 
 
The theory that Douglas North considers as relatively close for transaction cost 
approach to be based on is the neoclassical theory of institutional economics. Although, the 
neoclassical theory has been a major investment to understanding and works in the analysis 
of markets in developed countries it has significant problems and gaps - particularly there is 
a big contrast between the logical implications of the theory and the performance of 
economies in reality - that are not able to connect the transaction cost approach to the very 
theory without making changes in the assumptions made there.  
Namely “the neoclassical theory is based on the fundamental assumption of scarcity 
and hence competition; its harmonious implications come from its assumptions about a 
frictionless exchange process in which property rights are perfectly and costlessly specified 
and information is likewise costless to acquire” (North 1990, P11). The scarcity and hence 
competition assumption has been solid, whereas the other assumptions have not survived 
nearly so well. Specifically the other assumptions are made on a zero transaction cost 
approach. In a zero transaction cost world, the strength of bargaining has no influence on 
efficiency however in real life where as a rule positive transaction cost exists it does affect 
the efficiency. In his book (1990) North tries to fit the positive transaction cost approach to 
the neoclassical theory of institutions given the changes that should be made in the theory 
and state that only taking into account the transaction costs the theory may work in a better 
productivity.                                                                                                                                               
In the book by North and Thomas (1973) transformations of property rights in labor 
as well as in land are discussed with a notion that this kind of transformations lead to 
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changes of transaction costs applying to the organization of factors of production, which in 
its turn will lead to new institutional configurations. This very approach is set in the base of 
North’s newer book (1990). North (1990) indicates that the way institutions affect 
transaction and production costs, is the key to much of the institutional analysis. 
“Institutions affect the performance of the economy by their effect on the costs of exchange 
and production. Together with the technology employed they determine the transaction and 
transformation (production) costs that make up total costs” (North 1990, Series Editor’s 
Preface).  
“It takes resources to transform inputs of land, labor, and capital into the output of 
goods and services and that transformation is a function not only of the technology 
employed, but of institutions as well. Therefore, institutions play a key role in the costs of 
production” (North 1990, P61). “The total costs of production consist of the resource inputs 
of land, labor, and capital involved both in transforming the physical attributes of a good 
(size, weight, color, location, chemical composition, and so forth) and in transacting -
defining, protecting, and enforcing the property rights to goods (the right to use, the right to 
derive income from the use of, the right to exclude, and the right to exchange). Thus the 
costs of production are the sum of transformation and transaction costs” (North 1990, P28).  
North (1990) highlights the fact that substantial resources and efforts are devoted to the 
measurement and enforcement of agreements. Warranties, guarantees, trademarks, the 
resources devoted to sorting and grading, time and motion studies, the bonding of agents, 
arbitration, mediation, and of course the entire system of judicial process all reflect the 
ubiquity of measurement and enforcement (North 1990, P31). So far in his book North also 
indicates that, it is, however, measurement plus the costliness of enforcement that together 
determine the costs of transacting (North 1990, P32). Throughout the discussions North 
(1990, P66) emphasizes that the cost of transacting reflects the overall complex of 
institutions - formal and informal - that make up an economy or, on an even greater scale, a 
society and that overall structure ultimately shapes the cost of transacting at the individual 
contract level.                                                                                                                           
The very approach correspondents to the research question in several ways. Other 
than just revealing the institutional barriers to the investment climate of Armenia, the 
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transaction cost approach of the institutional analysis provides understanding on how 
exactly these barriers may affect the investor’s behavior and decision. 
However, the measurement of institutions and their changes pose perhaps the 
biggest challenge in the use of institutional analysis. However, the transaction cost 
approach is not called for measuring the level of effect the investor’s behavior is exposed 
to, rather it tries to shed a light on structures of both formal and informal institutions and 
predicts how the functioning or changes in that structures relates to the behavior of the 




The research is going to answer two main questions. The first research question is 
the following; what are the barriers to investment market of Armenia which cannot be 
reflected in the macro-economic figures - particularly the institutional ones?  
The hypothesis 1 of the first research question that the thesis is going to prove is the 
following; Informal networks of Armenia and governmental decisions on securing 
dominant positions of specific companies are generally acted as barriers to investment 
market of Armenia. 
The methodology for responding to this research question is based on the practical 
usage of the transaction cost approach of the institutional analysis. The formal and informal 
institutions of Armenia with their functioning and operation are affecting the transaction 
costs of the investor and/or entrepreneur making the transaction costs dependent from the 
working of institutions.  
The theory and literate review point out that low level transaction costs attract more 
investment whereas high level of transaction costs has negative effect on the investor’s 
decision, hinder the investment level of a country and thus negatively influence the overall 
investment climate of the state. Taking into account the mentioned, one of the core 
concepts of the thesis is constructed, in a way that the operation of institutions that lead to 
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an increase in transaction costs, finally negatively affect the investment climate of the 
country.  
The analysis of institutions will be implemented through case studies of 3 sectors of 
Armenian economy (Retail Sector, Energy Sector, Public Procurement Sector) which are 
assumed to be of high importance for the state economy. Through the analysis of these case 
studies, this study tries to demonstrate how the gaps in the functioning of formal and 
informal institutions of Armenia are affecting the change of transaction costs of the 
investors to Armenian market.  
Particularly the fails in the functioning of different institutions may generate corrupt 
practices. As was highlighted by Wei (2000) poor institutions may yield extra costs for the 
investor for instance through the corrupt practices. The corrupt practices are increasing the 
expenses of the investor, thus increasing the transaction costs of the latter. In this sense 
corruption will be used as one of the indicators assessing the change in the transaction 
costs. 
The rule of law is another indicator demonstrating the increase or decrease of transaction 
costs. As stated by Krueger (1974) the poor institutions of the country lead to weak rule of 
law. This may put the investor in a situation where in order to defend his rights or in order 
to stick his counterparts to the legislation of the country, or to the rules of this or that 
contract the investor spends additional amount of money on the legal system of the country. 
This spending increase the overall transaction costs of the investor. 
The cases are taken from various reports carried out by international organizations 
(e.g. World Bank, U.S. Department of State and etc.) and from different announcements 
and publications by mostly Armenian media, particularly from the ones which during the 
time of their existence and activity have demonstrated more or less unbiased and 
trustworthy information and are considered as reliable sources of information by the society 
of Armenia.  
The second research question is the following; what is Russia’s role in causing 
institutional barriers in Armenia’s investment market? 
The hypothesis 2 of this research question is that Russia stimulates the rise of the 
institutional barriers in the investment market of Armenia. 
27 
 
In order to pursue more in-depth information as well as solid viewpoints about 
Russia’s role in the institutional barriers of investment market in Armenia and to prove the 
hypothesis 2, structured interviews are carried out. Although the interviews are structured 
upon the receipt of the answers to the questions stated in the questionnaire, the interviewees 
have been contacted again if the answers to the questions were not clear or were there was a 
need of some more explanation in order to have clearly formulated responses. The 
questionnaire includes 4 questions which are discussed below:  
1) Is there observed a tendency of market concentration, monopolization in Armenia 
by Russia’s investments? 
The question tends to reveal the general form of investment inflows to Armenia 
coming from Russia. The positive outcome of the question that is if the investments tend to 
concentrate the market, as discussed through the theory has a negative impact on the 
investment market of the state. What is more, the concentration of the market may raise 
new barriers for the new investors overcoming which may increase the transaction costs of 
the latter. The negative answers of the respondents to this question will mean that the 
investments from Russia to Armenia do not tend to concentration, thus raise the 
competition in the market and positively affect the market. 
2) What are the main reasons for the existence of Russian companies in Armenia that 
have dominant positions in the state’s economy?  
The aim of this question is to demonstrate whether the dominant positions of 
Russian companies in Armenian market is acquired as a result of free competition or as a 
result of various informalities that lead to such situation. 
3) Is the problem with high shares of monopolies in Armenian economic market more 
conditioned with the gaps in the law itself or with not proper enforcement of the 
law? 
If the responds point out that the problem is in the proper enforcement of the law the 
answer will benefit the idea that the concentration of the market is occurred in order to 
secure the interests of the informal networks of Armenia which are tightly linked with 
Armenian Government and officials, are limiting the legal activities of competent 
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authorities. Otherwise, if the main problem is in the failures of the law itself, this will firstly 
mean that the concentration of the market is acquired through legal channels and the law is 
not violated, and secondly that the solution of the problem is linked with adoption of a 
better law and other formal processes rather than with informal institutions.  
4) Do Russia’s investments into Armenian economy hinder domestic and other foreign 
investment inflows to Armenia? 
The negative answer to this question will point out that Russia has no visible role in 
stimulating institutional barriers to investment climate of Armenia, whereas the positive 
response will benefit the Hypotheses 2. 
The questionnaire has been presented to respondents in two languages - Armenian and 
English (As long as mostly the responses have been carried out in Armenian, the answer 
sheets are not included in the paper, but are ready to be presented upon request.). The 
number of interviewees is 9 (For the details of the respondents see Appendix 4) and 
includes past and present officials, politicians and political analysts as well as economists. 
The politicians among the respondents have been chosen in the way to have people from 
different political camps and thus to try to secure the existence of different viewpoints. 
The data collected through interviews are called to prove the hypothesis 2 through 
the theory in a way that the country of origin of foreign investments matter, meaning that 
there is an importance to take into account the investments to Armenia from Russia. The 
data will try to prove that the way how Russian investments enter Armenian economy also 
matters, particularly meaning whether these inflows lead or tend to lead to concentrations 
and monopolization of the market. The answers of respondents will be referred to in order 







CHAPTER 2. CASE STUDIES 
RETAIL SECTOR 
 
The first sector of Armenian economy that is going to be observed in the scope of 
these case studies is the retail sector of Armenia. The latest statistics (2013) show that the 
share of the retail sector in the whole trade realized in Armenia during 2013 is almost 68 
percent (Armenian Statistical Service of Republic of Armenia 2013) which makes the 
discussion of this sector of high importance for Armenian economy. 
Here, the role of State Commission for the Protection of Economic Competition of 
the Republic of Armenia (SCPEC) is vital for both attracting new investors and for the 
companies that are already functioning. The goals of SCPEC include but not limited to 
protection and promotion of economic competition, creation of appropriate environment for 
fair competition, contribution to the development of entrepreneurship (SCPEC 2007). Even 
taking into account only the goals of the SCPEC it is obvious that the role of this state 
organization in the state’s investment climate is essential. In contrast to the law (SCPEC 
2007) in the scope of which the SCPEC acts, the decisions made by the SCPEC are not 
always clear and unbiased which is believed is the effect of informal networks operating in 
the country.  
 
Informal Institutions in the Retail Sector of Armenia 
 
The latest statistics (Year 2013) show that 89% of computer users in Armenia are in 
the use of unlicensed software (A. Barseghyan 2013). Although compared to 2006 this 
number decreased by 7 percent, it still remains very high. This high percentage is closely 
linked to the fact that absolute majority of the shops sell computers with already unlicensed 
software installed there. Today in Armenia, de facto the main company that is interested in 
the fight against the usage of unlicensed computer programs is the representative office of 
“Microsoft” company in Armenia. As long as the very company is responsible for the 
provision of programs for absolute majority of computers used in the country, it is logical 
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that Microsoft Armenia tends to act in an environment where the rules of fair competition 
and intellectual property rights (IPR) are protected and what is not less important honored 
and respected. Undoubtedly, this will increase the volume of purchases of the licensed 
products supplied by the very company, which in its turn will increase the company’s 
profits. The Microsoft copyright infringement by the shops selling computers or software in 
the country get opportunity to sell their products in lower prices, where the difference in the 
price is formed merely from the usage of non licensed software.                           
The gaps in the implementation of SCPEC’s direct functions lead to barriers that 
hinder investment. These barriers are presented in the form of insufficient enforcement of 
IPR. It is known that the strengthening of IPR in most developing countries has resulted in 
an increase in investment inflows (Samuel Adams 2000). If the organization responsible – 
in this case SCPEC – for this or that reason fails to realize its functions, which in this case 
is the creation of appropriate environment for fair competition through strengthening of IPR 
then the announcement of Microsoft Armenia’s CEO that, no company is making major 
investments for creating a product that can be distributed and sold in the local market 
(Ibid), can be easily explained.  
However, here the main reason of insufficient enforcement of IPR is not the gaps in 
the legal system, rather than the existence of informal institutions. Some chains of 
computer shops which in the line with other sellers violate IPR are owned by powerful 
politicians or their relatives who in reality limit the functioning of authorities liable for the 
protection of property rights. Another problem here is the high level of corruption, bribery 
and corrupted court system. Even when the cases of illegal usage of intellectual property is 
revealed – which is actually not that difficult task – only in very rare cases these trespassers 
are bring to justice due to paying bribes to authorities and even if they are fined as a rule 
they continue their illegal activity.  
The gaps in the functioning of SCPEC are not limited to those mentioned earlier. It 
is clearly stated that the SCPEC should protect and promote economic competition as well 
as create an appropriate environment for fair competition. For Armenia’s case these 
functions are implemented only on case by case bases regarding whose interests – primarily 
economic and/or political – the implementation of the law may touch. It is not a secret 
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among the population of Armenia that there is no clear segregation of business and politics 
in the sense that high level officials for instance members of National Assembly are 
generally engaged in business activities, despite the fact that it is prohibited by the law. 
These tough links between politics and business /as well as between politicians and 
businessmen/ is a decisive factor negatively affecting the majority of institutions 
functioning in Armenia. This, in its turn has a negative effect on the investment climate of 
the country.  
Here the main problems are the informal constraints rather than the formal ones. 
“Although formal rules may change overnight as the result of political or judicial decisions, 
informal constraints embodied in customs, traditions, and codes of conduct are much more 
impervious to deliberate policies” (Douglas North 1990, P 6). In Armenia it is far well 
known that there are some sectors of economy where no one is able to transact there 
without any patronage by several powerful members of state government or even by 
President of RA himself. This kind of political patronage as a rule violates formal laws, 
because as a rule nepotism and cronyism has a place to be there.  
Among many cases, the best example could be the accession into Armenian market 
in 2011 by the French hypermarket chain “Carrefour”. Probably it would be better to say 
the decision of the entry into market, as till today the market chain has not started its 
functioning due to one or more barriers raised as a result of failures in the work of SCPEC 
and not only. The case of “Carrefour” is interesting in the way that it is one of the biggest 
hypermarket chains in the world and widely known brand (“Carrefour” homepage 2014). 
Thus, one would probably assume that such a company will not face institutional barriers, 
particularly the informal ones taking into account its well known reputation.  
In 2011 an agreement was reached between “Carrefour” and one of the Armenian 
malls on providing 10 thousand square meters area to “Carrefour” for opening the 
hypermarket (“Carrefour” supermarket chain 2013). However, this agreement was canceled 
by the representatives of the mall and what is more “Carrefour” failed to get any other place 
for its activity – with no logical explanation – in other parts of the city too. It is obvious 
that such an attitude towards the investor was directed and managed by the representatives 
of high echelon and as some analysts argue it was directly linked to the “Carrefour’s” will 
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to import the products that should be sold in the hypermarket. The initial computations 
showed that it will lead to lower prices in “Carrefour” than the average prices in the retail 
market of Armenia. This would for sure influence entrepreneurs acting in Armenia, 
especially those whose businesses have dominated or monopolistic positions in the market. 
So as can be observed if function “Carrefour” will be a solid competitor not only for other 
supermarkets/hypermarkets but also it will be a strong competitor for importing companies, 
many of which have monopolistic or dominant positions in the country.  
Thus, the motivation that drives the formation of such barriers becomes obvious. 
These kinds of barriers are a function of the existence of informal networks involving 
Armenian political elite – that have evolved during the time and recently has become 
probably the most powerful decision making institution, though informal – and non-
functioning or functioning with many flaws of appropriate bodies, including SCPEC. The 
heated debates on the case of “Carrefour” lead to a situation where even the US 
Ambassador to Armenia John Heffern referred to the question, particularly highlighting his 
desire to see “Carrefour” in Armenia (John Heffern 2013). However, when the ambassador 
of a country like US even states its wish – especially when it is out of his direct 
responsibilities and functions – it is seen more as a call – in this case to let “Carrefour” 
function in the country – rather than just a personal desire. One can also consider this as a 
result of informal networking between the representatives of “Carrefour” and US Embassy 
as one of the most powerful foreign representation in the country.  
On April 2013 after several months of negotiations The National Secretary of the 
RA National Security Council (NSC) informed that the Armenian market accession process 
of “Carrefour” is assumed to be finished by the end of the  year 2013 (The “Road Map 
2013”). Some analysts argue that the very agreement was reached due to “Carrefour’s” 
interest in Armenian supermarket chains. Specifically, the owner of the biggest Armenian 
supermarket chain “Yerevan City” announced that “Carrefour” demonstrated interest in 
buying his supermarket chain if operating in Armenian retail market (Samvel Aleksanyan 
2013).  
Here the main point that arises is that de facto the accession of Armenian retail 
market by one of the biggest hypermarket chains and reputed brand is followed by various 
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barriers which as a rule arise from the private interests and desires of Armenian 
businessmen and politicians or often both in one person. However, the announcement made 
by the NSC has not come true. By the first quarter of the year 2014 “Carrefour” has not 
started its functioning in Armenia yet. Although, from time to time various state agencies 
announce that no barriers exist for the functioning of “Carrefour” and that the very chain 
would start its activity very soon, this cannot be admitted as given. It is a fact that an entry 
of a supermarket chain lasts almost 3 years and what is more, it is still nothing exact. These 
kinds of experiences definitely have a great negative effect on the prestige of a country as 
an investment market.  
The existence of the import monopolies in Armenia is another reason hindering 
foreign investment. It is barely possible even to imagine a de jure democratic country with 
a de jure free market economy where the 44.3 percent of the foodstuffs markets and 83.3 
percent of the markets for household items are represented by import monopolies (Hrayr 
Maroukhian Foundation, 2013). However, the problem of import monopolies is not 
something new for Armenian markets. The roots of this problem is dated back to the early 
1990s when the economic policy makers of Armenia, after Armenian independence, have 
failed to declare the economic policy of Armenia as well as its long-term goals. As 
objective reasons that have not allowed the policymakers to declare and define a long-term 
economic agenda of the country can be mentioned the war, the rapid privatization of the 
post soviet era as well as financial and political tension of the time. However, the main 
problem is that even after 23 years after Armenian Independence, unfortunately, no 
significant changes have been occurred in either the institutional economic structure of 
Armenia or the principles of governance system.  
However, it should be stated that these monopolies have arisen due to a strong 
patronage of high level politicians rather than by the excellent operation of their businesses, 
free market competition, introduction of something innovative. Starting from the 
independence of Armenia in 1991, groups of people on the head of the country have made 
an enough clear division of sectors of business and economy of Armenia among each other, 
which continues till today, and any new investment, entrepreneurship in these sectors has 
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always been accompanied by many artificial barriers unless these actors are the new players 
pointed by the powerful political and economic informal networks of Armenia.  
  As a result, now in such a small market as is Armenia, where the presence of import 
monopolies has a vital role in economic development, many monopolies and oligopolies 
operate. When speaking about import monopolies it is worth to mention the sugar market, 
which fairly can be ranked as the most widely known one in Armenia. During the previous 
decade the granulated sugar market has become the most discussed monopoly by 
economists, policymakers, media and shopkeepers alike. Although, the company managing 
this monopoly has changed different names through the time, it has had an absolutely 
dominant position in the market since the establishment of SCPEC, hence, since the 
implementation of the legislation on economic competition. The sugar market is the most 
concentrated market in Armenia. SCPEC demonstrates the characteristics of the market and 
the key indicators of the sugar market can be observed in the Table 1 below.  
 
















































































































































2011 High 5 Lusastgh Sugar: 99,0 432.8 125.1 109.9 372.5 1.16 
2010 High  Alex Grig LLC: 77,5 346.0 114.4 111.8 373.6 0.93 
2009 High 6 Alex Grig LLC: 99,9 302.5 123.2 151.5 363.3 0.83 
2008 High 21 Salex Group 
LLC:91,4 
245.4 96.2 116.6 306 0.80 
2007    255.2 79.6 64.3 342.1 0.75 
2006 High 21 Salex Group LLC: 
91,4 
320.4 129.6 144.8 416 0.77 
2005 High 21 Salex Group LLC: 
91,4 
247.2 96.3 94.8 457.7 0.54 
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2004 High 23 Fleetfood LLC: 99,4 256.7 97.6 93.0 533.4 0.48 
2003 High 7 Astghatsolk LLC: 
81,6% 
262.9 101.9 131.8 578.8 0.45 
2002 High 11 Astghatsolk LLC: 
94,8% 
257.9 99.4 79.9   
2001 High 9 Astghatsolk LLC: 
79,8% 
259.4 112.7 111.6   
From 2001 to 2003, the same company has controlled 79-95 percent of the sugar 
market of Armenia, having both rises and falls in the volume of the market control. 
However, it can be easily observed that starting from 2004 the very company has 
continuously controlled more than 90 percent of the sugar market, reaching 99.9 percent in 
2009 and 99 percent in 2011.  
Table 2 (Ibid) 
Commodity Market Number of 
Participants in 
Commodity Market 














1 Wheat Floor 43 51 78.9 87.6 High High 
2 Sugar 21 6 99.9 100.0 High High 
3 Butter 23 20 84.1 67.6 High Medium 
4 Chicken eggs in the shell 12 6 85.9 80.6 High High 
5 Frozen fish 11 20 72.3 62.3 High Medium 
6 Rice 19 28 66.6 62.8 Medium Medium 
7 Unused tires of 
passenger cars 
60 36 46.6 66.7 Medium Medium 
8 Gasoline 7 5 89.9 93.9 High High 
9 Diesel fuel 11 7 76.3 95.1 High High 
Total number of 
competitors in commodity 
markets 
207 179     
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It also should not be overlooked the fact that as shown on Table 2 the number of 
importer companies has demonstrated a drastic decrease reaching from 21 firms to just 6 in 
2011. It is interesting that another 0.1 percent of the sugar market is controlled by 5 other 
firms. This is mainly done for avoiding to have just a single importer and to artificially 
make the “Lusastgh Sugar” firm, a company with a dominant position rather than 
monopolistic position. However, even in such artificially constructed market the 3 of the 
other firms are not selling the sugar as it is; these companies are confectionery producers, 
so the sugar they import is mainly used in their products and is not sold as a pure sugar by 
itself. The activities of the other 2 companies are not clear, but in fact, one should not 
overlook the possibility that these companies can also belong to the very monopolist, 
though not registered under the same name.  
However, de facto there is just one importer in the sugar market and whenever the 
question on this issue is raised in the National Assembly by the opposition - who are 
minority there - the government as well as SCPEC behaves themselves like a dedicated 
server and advocate of the systemic corruption and monopolies of the country. What is 
more, if even theoretically assume that another company after many barriers faced starts 
importing sugar to the national market, there is a high probability that the very company 
will not be able to realize its product due to unfair competition.  
Particularly, the “Lusastgh Sugar” firm belongs to an oligarch who is 
simultaneously a deputy of Armenian National Assembly and a friend of the president 
itself. Thus, having such levers and using informal networking his firm(s) somehow avoid 
full payment of taxes which means that the very company will be able to supply sugar with 
the lowest price in the market thus driving out from the market all other contestants, as has 
actually been done.                                                    
Almost the same situation is with the wheat flour, butter and chicken eggs markets 
and etc., though with lower concentration. This kind of market economy led to the today’s 
reality of Armenia, where the wealth of trade flows into the coffers of the already dominant 
businessmen-politicians, strengthening their position, weakening the state parliament, and 
contributing to the tilted balance of political power, which persisted and support the lack of 
economic and political development in the country.                     
37 
 
Transaction Cost in the Retail Sector of Armenia 
 
The cases related to the retail sector of Armenia discussed show that in Armenia 
informal institutions work for enhancing the benefits of the representatives of local elites 
rather than a tool for new investors in overcoming complex political systems, patronage 
networks and unclear legal environments. In this sense, in Armenia informal networking is 
mostly used as a mechanism for giving born to informal constraints, which in its turn 
increase the transaction costs, pushing the investor to find more reliable information for 
making business decisions, use the expensive legal system of the country, due to the low 
level of trust and reputation of the country. As Kerr (2010) argues it would be possible to 
overcome complex political systems and unclear legal environments for foreign investors if 
the level of trust formed by the informal networks was high.  
The case of “Carrefour” is one of the classic cases where the increase in transaction 
costs is clearly demonstrated. The supermarket chain during the latest 3 years has spent 
money for accessing the retail market of Armenia; however, these costs are more related to 
overcoming the artificially raised constraints mentioned earlier which in the end lead to the 
decision of buying the existing supermarket chain in the country in order to get access to 
the market. The procurement of this supermarket chain should be considered as a price for 
acting in the very sector. This increases the transaction costs for “Carrefour”. It is obvious 
that the transaction costs would be much less for “Carrefour” if the informal networks 
which as was already mentioned are formed from powerful members of the State 
Government as well has been willing to see the supermarket chain in the country.  
In the retail sector of Armenia one probably will come up with one of the most 
significant problems of the investment climate of Armenia that is the company that decides 
to invest in the country in the line with its personal gains should take into consideration the 
interests of the elite or the informal institutions on behalf of informal networks. Indeed, de 
facto the operation of the company is decided by these elites rather than by the free market 
economy. And from several examples mentioned earlier in this chapter it is obvious that 
relying on the formal institutions in overcoming the raised barriers is naivety. This in its 
turn led to some environment where the investor in order to realize his business ideas 
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should find other ways mostly informal to overcome the existing barriers like giving bribes 
which as Wei (2000) believes leads to extra costs for the investment.   
It is obvious that this kind of behavior, particularly engagement in corruption 
processes again increases the transaction costs of the investor and as suggests the theory 
high transaction costs negatively affects the investment climate in the retail sector of the 
country (Fazzari et al. 1988). The experience also suggests that giving bribes for transacting 
in the market by a certain company or investor do not limit to a single case, when it 
becomes obvious that the investor is ready to have high transaction costs that is to give 
bribes, during their activity they are usually being put in situations when they have to 
continue to pay bribes in order to continue their activities thus having additional costs.  
Any new investment, any new undertaking or business startup in the country should 
consider these gaps as a factor that probably will have a negative impact on its activity. 
Though institutions in general are called for decreasing the transaction costs, just vice versa 
happens when the very institutions do not carry out their functions or function with major 
omissions. Protection and enforcement of IPR – which along with other factors that form 
the transaction costs – in Armenia are not being ensured due to the improper function of the 
organizations responsible for it. As Merges argues (1995) intellectual property rights lower 
transacion costs. The gaps in the enforcement of IPR in Armenia lead to an increase in the 
transaction costs of a company that would like to make an investment as it takes some 
additional resources firstly to define and then also to protect the IPR which in this kind of 
environment should be realized mostly by the investor himself due to the weak rule of law. 
Otherwise as in the case of Microsoft Armenia the company loses or the same to say does 
not make the profit it should. 
The increase in the costs of investor particularly the increase of the share of 
transaction costs is a factor that mostly negatively influences the decision of the 
entrepreneur whether or not to act in some specific sector of economy. Although there will 
be and are for sure investors who will be willing to act in such an environment, as 
mentioned by Doytch and Eren (2012) this will take place if the investors are in the position 
of receiving better incentives from the situation in the market, however, many of them may 
find it not profitable deal giving in mind the increase in transaction costs that in the retail 
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sector of Armenia is merely formed as a result of bargaining with informal networks and as 
an outcome of satisfying the interests of these networks or of some individuals in that 
networks. 
The cases discussed in the retail sector of Armenia with a notion on existence and 
operation of informal institutions in that sector directly or indirectly affect the transaction 
costs for new investments, influence the decision making of investors and thus affect the 
























In this chapter the focus is made on the latest events in the framework of Armenia’s 
energy sector and Russia’s role in the energy sector of Armenia. This will be discussed in 
the framework of formal institutions particularly with a notion on the agreements and 
contracts between Armenia and Russia related to the sector. When studying the energy 
sector of Armenia, one firstly comes up with discussions on the role of natural gas in the 
country. This seems logical if taking into account that the consumption of natural gas is 
accounting for almost the half of the total energy consumption in Armenia (M. Grigoryan 
2008).  
 
Formal Institutions in the Energy Sector of Armenia 
 
On December 19th of 2013 the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Armenia 
declared that the agreements on the supply of natural gas signed up between the Republic 
of Armenia (RA) and Russian Federation (RF) – which later have been also ratified by the 
National Assembly of Armenia – are in the scope of the Constitution of Armenia 
(Armenia’s parliament ratifies 2013). This specifically applies to the agreements named 
“The conditions of “ArmRosGazprom” Closed Joint-Stock Company’s share trading and 
future activities”, “About the regulation on the price formation of natural gas supplied to 
the Republic of Armenia”, “About the cooperation on the supply of gas, oil and natural 
rough diamonds to the Republic of Armenia”. These agreements, especially the points 
stated in the agreement “The conditions of “ArmRosGazprom” Closed Joint-Stock 
Company’s share trading and future activities” (Government of Russia 2013) /hereinafter 
“the Agreement”/ have become a subject of heated discussions in the scope of Armenia’s 
political lifecycle. Many analysts and members of National Assembly of Armenia, in 
contrast to the decision of the Constitutional Court of Armenia, pointed out that this 
Agreement contradicts the Armenian Constitution and is degrading for Armenia and 
Armenians as well.                                                                                                  
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The Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources of Armenia – in the way prescribed 
by the Agreement – gave its 20 percent share in “ArmRosGazprom” CJSC to “Gazprom” 
OJSC for 63,334 billion AMD (Nearly $153,026,000, converted by Oanda, 19.05.2014 ), 
thus making “Gazprom” OJSC the owner of 100 percent of authorized capital of 
“ArmRosGazprom”. What is more, as prescribed by the Agreement, the acquisition of this 
20 percent of shares by “Gazprom” OJSC was realized through direct sales method, that is 
without any agreement and permit required by RA legislation including the agreements 
required by the SCPEC. The kind of decision not to involve SCPEC in the sales process 
seems doubtful given in mind that by this operation “Gazprom” OJSC de facto acquires a 
monopolistic position in gas supply to Armenia. However, it is worth to mention that this is 
not the only point of the Agreement that makes the whole deal look not that beneficial for 
Armenian side.     
The Article 3 of the Agreement states that the Russian side guarantees the delivery 
of natural gas by “Gazprom” OJSC to Armenia in amounts sufficient to fully meet the 
internal needs of the RA and the Armenian side ensures that the gas delivered from Russia 
to Armenia, which is intended for consumption in the domestic market of Armenia, will not 
be exported.  
What is more the Article 5 of the Agreement stipulates that “ArmRosGazprom” 
CSJC possesses the exclusive right to import gas from Russia to Armenia. This means that 
it automatically prohibits Armenia from getting any amount of gas from Russian company 
other than “Gazprom” OJSC, regardless whether or not the conditions offered by the other 
companies are or will be better in the future.  
As about the duration of the Agreement, here comes one of the key points of the 
very Agreement. The last article of the Agreement –that is the Article 11 – states that the 
Agreement is signed for an indefinite period of time, meaning that it theoretically may be in 
operation till both sides decide to cancel the Agreement. Taking into account the fact that at 
least in the near future it stems from Russia’s interests to sell as large amount of gas as 
possible, it becomes obvious that the Agreement will be cancelled whenever Russia on 
behalf of “Gazprom” OJSC will have a desire or need to do that.  
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However, the mostly discussed part of the Agreement among Armenian politicians 
and political analysts is the Article 7. The very Article of the Agreement states that the 
Armenian side guarantees that the rights and interests of “Gazprom” OJSC, 
“ArmRosGazprom” CSJC and their respective successors, are not subject to change, 
amendment withdrawal or reductions without Russia’s consent till 31st of December 2043. 
Armenians and Armenian analysts believe that 30 years for this kind of agreement is a very 
big period of time. It is believed that signing a kind of agreement for 30 years in the 
framework of very drastic global changes in the research and development, in a world 
where many companies rise and others “die” in a very short period, where offers, interests, 
and obligations of companies and countries are subject to radical changes, this is a short-
sighted project putting Armenia in a dependency from one country and/or even a company.  
Moreover, the Article 7 also indicates that the Armenian side guarantees that until 
31 December 2043 no future laws, decrees, orders and other normative legal acts will 
change and/or cancel and/or in any other way violate the rights and interests of “Gazprom” 
OJSC, “ArmRosGazprom” CJSC and their respective successors as stated in the 
Agreement. This assumes that during the next 30 years, regardless what political and/or 
economic situation will be in the country, in the region or worldwide, no legal act amended 
by Armenia should affect the very Agreement. The Agreement goes even deeper by noting 
that if by 2043, December 31 inclusive, the RA amend any legal act that will repeal, change 
or in any other way violate the rights and interests of “Gazprom” OJSC, 
“ArmRosGazprom” CJSC and their respective successors as stated in the Agreement, it will 
not be applied to these companies. The ex Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia Alik 
Arzumanyan indicates that the very Agreement completely restricts all the rights of one of 
the sides and ensures all the rights of the other side (The details 2013). Mr. Arzumanyan 
also noted that the very Agreement contradicts the Armenian Constitution in many ways 
and as an addition states that this kind of agreements are called capitulation acts rather than 
agreements between 2 partner countries.  
In order to support his belief Mr Arzumanyan calls the Article 6. The Article 6 of 
the Agreement states that in the territory of Armenia, any property belonging to “Gazprom” 
or to persons affiliated with “Gazprom” enjoy a full and unconditional protection by the RA 
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and cannot be exposed to direct or indirect expropriation, nationalization or requisition, as 
well as to other changes that may lead to consequences that are tantamount to 
expropriation, nationalization or requisition. It also states that if contrary to the terms of the 
Agreement such expropriation nationalization, requisition or other deprivation of property, 
rights or interests take place then the Armenian side will promptly reimburse the value of 
such property, rights or interests in full market value and in U.S. dollar. This in the line 
with other Articles of the Agreement mentioned earlier indicates that during the next 30 
years anything that will affect negatively “Gazprom’s” property and in general 
“Gazprom’s” interests as stated in the Agreement, will be totally covered and/or reimbursed 
by the Armenian side, however, nothing is mentioned about the sanctions that will be 
applied to the other side for not actualizing its duties and obligations.            
 
The Price and Quality of Armenian Gas and the Possible Alternative Supplier 
 
Another important side of natural gas supply is the price. Here, even the price at 
which Russia supplies gas to Armenia is a question under dispute. Many times the 
Armenian Government has indicated that the price at which Armenia gets natural gas from 
Russia equals to $189 for 1000 cubic meters of gas (Russia to supply 2013). However, in 
reality no one in Armenia gets gas at the very price. That is the price at which 
“ArmRosGazprom” CJSC is getting gas from “Gazprom” OJSC. Thus, after “Gazprom” 
OJSC becomes the sole owner of “ArmRosGazprom” CJSC, this means that “Gazprom” 
OJSC is selling gas just to himself in the face of its subsidiary “ArmRosGazprom” CJSC. 
The real price at which the consumers in Armenia get gas is $391 /AMD 158,000/ (Hrant 
Bagratyan 2013).  
Here, logically a question arises, whether or not Armenia can get natural gas on 
better conditions. This question has especially become widely discussed after the 
Ambassador of Iran to Armenia declares that Iran may distribute gas to Armenia with 
cheaper prices than it does to other countries, though the Ambassador did not state any 
concrete price (N. Bulghadarian 2013). Armenian government on behalf of the RA Minister 
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of Energy and Natural Resources Armen Movsisyan has announced that Iran suggests 
Armenia gas for more than $400 for 1000 cubic meters, thus stating that it cannot be 
considered as a profitable deal for Armenia. Afterwards, however, Iranian Ambassador put 
under doubt the announcement made by Mr. Movsisyan, which means that it is still under 
doubt the price at which Iran is eager to sell Iranian gas to Armenia.  
It is worth to mention, that today, Armenia gets Iranian gas
 
which however, is used 
solely in combine heat and power stations. The official data presented by the RA State 
Revenue Committee shows that Iran delivers gas to Armenia at the price $181 for 1000 
cubic meters (Mr. Pashinyan 2013). This price, even if comparing to the price at which 
“Gazprom” OJSC sells the gas to “ArmRosGazprom” CJSC is $8 less. It is obvious that if 
Iran is exporting gas to Armenia at the very price, there is no difference for them whether 
this gas is used in the heat and power stations or by other subscribers as well.  
The reasons why Armenia did not import Iranian gas for internal needs before the 
signing of the Agreement with Russia are also matter of discussions. The main barriers for 
the importing Iranian gas was/is Russia, United States of America (USA) and European 
Union (EU). They all have been against the import of Iranian gas by Armenia and each of 
these geopolitical units has their own reason for that. However, the recent progress in the 
relations between the West and Iran may drastically change the situation. If Iran and the 
West achieve a long-term settlement, both USA and EU will be for importation of Iranian 
gas by Armenia, thus reducing the dependency of Armenia from Russia. What is more, the 
export of Iranian gas to Europe through Iran Armenia Georgia transit way may be of great 
interest, taking into account Europe’s will to have alternative natural gas routes bypassing 
Russia and Turkey, and as a transit country Armenia would definitely get gas with far lower 
price.  
The kind of pressure from Russia’s side is not something new. After the completion 
of Iran-Armenia natural gas pipeline in 2008, the Armenian Ministry of Energy announced 
that Armenia does not need Iranian gas yet. Here again many analysts linked this with 
Russia’s pressures on Armenia (Op. cit. M.Grigoryan). What is more, Russia possesses not 
only all the natural gas pipeline network within Armenia that supplies Russian gas, but the 
Armenian part of the Iran-Armenia pipeline is also owned by Russia in the face of 
45 
 
“ArmRosGazprom” CJSC, which is an additional warranty that through the pipelines 
existing in Armenia will flow exclusively Russian gas.  
Moreover, natural gas has a big role in Armenia’s electricity production. Armenia's 
thermal power stations (which supply approximately 24% of Armenia's electricity needs) 
run on natural gas. Talking about the electricity of Armenia, here comes out another 
significant fact. The “Electric Networks of Armenia” CJSC (“ENA” CJSC) was founded in 
May of 2002 as merger of four state regional companies (“Yerevan Electric Networks”, 
“North Electric Networks”, “South Electric Networks” and “Central Electric Networks”) 
distributing and selling electric energy (“ENA” CJSC homepage). The company is mainly 
engaged in regulated distribution and sales of electric energy. Overall spread of its grid is 
36 thousand km. The company provides service to about 935.000 customers.  
What is more, the company is also a monopoly and has an exclusive license for 
distribution of electric energy within the Republic of Armenia. In addition to the above 
mentioned, "Electric Networks of Armenia" CJSC is a subsidiary of Russian “INTER RAO 
UES” ОJSC. “INTER RAO UES” ОJSC is a functioning operator of electricity exports and 
imports on the territory of Russia. As can be seen the electricity of Armenia also belongs to 
Russia/Russian company which even deepens the dependency of Armenia from Russia.  
These monopolies also restrain the technological progress in the sphere and make super 
profit by reducing the quality of the production. The latter has largely been discussed in 
Armenia recently, in the framework of the quality of supplied natural gas. Many analysts 
argue that the calorific value of natural gas used in Armenia is much less than the standards 
state.  
In addition the ex Prime Minister of Armenia Hrant Bagratyan has indicated that 
even if one consider that the calorific value of natural gas used by Armenian consumers 
satisfies the standards, those standards are much lower than the ones used in EU countries, 
and in order to compare the prices of natural gas among countries the calorific value of the 
gas must be taken into account. The calculations made by Dr. Bagratyan led to the 
conclusion that in order to compare the gas supplied to Armenia and the gas supplied to 
Europe one should multiply the price at which Armenia gets gas by 1.27, which in its turn 
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makes Armenia a country that gets one of the most expensive gas in Europe, as noted by 
Dr. Bagratyan (Op. cit. Hrant Bagratyan).  
Although the companies like “ArmRosGazprom” CJSC and “Electric Networks of 
Armenia” CJSC are enjoying the advantages of their monopolistic position, these 
companies are largely managed in an inefficient way. The tariffs of these monopolies are 
mostly affected by their investment levels, and it is worth to mention that the very 
companies fail to realize the investment obligations that were assumed under concession or 
privatization contracts. The energy sector has not benefited from significant investment 
projects or any visible modernization of the infrastructure. This in a broad sense comes 
from the inefficient work of the governmental institutions of Armenia and the absence of 
the civil society as an institution.  
 
 
Transaction Cost in the Energy Sector of Armenia 
 
Due to different objective and subjective problems existing in the functioning of 
Armenian Government - which will be discussed later in this study - Russia gets 
opportunity to acquire monopolistic positions in the energy sector of Armenia in this very 
case through de jure legal channels, formal institutions, that is through signing agreements 
and contracts that serve its interests, however, leading to an environment where no other 
actor can operate, de facto without Russia’s permission.  
This is assumed from the Agreement and particularly from the Article 3 of the 
agreement stated earlier. It actually means that till the end of the Agreement Armenia will 
not be able to get gas from other suppliers. Although it is not prohibited by the Agreement, 
but taking into account the fact that in the scope of the Agreement Armenia will get the full 
amount of gas that is needed for the domestic use and will not be able to export that gas, 
there is no need and logic to get additional gas from other exporters. So this is one of the 
formal constraints that both directly and indirectly hinder the future investors/suppliers 
47 
 
from operating in the very sphere and raises almost insurmountable barrier for accessing 
the market. 
Taking into account the fact that the Agreement is signed for the indefinite period of 
time (Article 11) this situation will continue until Russia sees any interest in ending it. This 
means that for instance if Armenia would like to get Iranian gas, taking into consideration 
that the latter is willing to supply that gas and taking into account that it may be 
economically even more profitable for Armenia as mentioned earlier, it is becoming 
obvious that without ensuring Russia’s no matter economic or political interests this kind of 
project is almost impossible after signing of the Agreement. In this case the question is 
whether Iran or Armenia (or maybe both) should pay for getting “permission” of the supply 
of Iranian gas to Armenia. If the Iran as the investor party in order to supply gas to Armenia 
will be willing to ensure Russia’s interests in order to get access to Armenia’s energy 
market it can be considered as an added expenditure which increases the supplier’s 
transaction costs.  
Particularly the monopolization by “Gazprom” OJSC on behalf of 
“ArmRosGazprom” CJSC in Armenian energy market is a demonstration of concentration 
of the sector. As stated by Mathis (2005) the concentration of the market may yield to 
negative effects for the host country in this case for Armenia particularly holds back 
development and raise prices about which the case study discussed.  
Taking into account today’s geopolitical situation it is assumed that Iran can make a 
political/economic suggestion to Russia, which should rise firstly from Russia’s interest 
which theoretically may lead to permission for Iran - Armenia gas delivery. However, as 
said this should primarily ensure Russia’s interests meaning having additional spending for 
Iran which will be demonstrated as a supplement to transaction costs. 
Depending on the level the transaction costs are increased that is the terms at which 
Russia may agree to change the Agreement or cancel it thus giving an opportunity for Iran 
to supply gas to Armenia, the supplier that is Iran will decide whether or not it worth to 
operate in Armenia’s energy market, whereas in the absence of the Agreement it would be 
completely another situation where the permission from Russia will not be needed, 
therefore no increase in transaction costs would be made. As it can be seen in the energy 
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sector of Armenia formal institutions lead to barriers that hinder any foreign actor who 
would be eager to act – in this situation particularly Iran – in the market and lead to a 
situation where there is practically little or no possibility to alter the main gas supplier that 

























PUBLIC PROCUREMENT SECTOR 
 
In the report “2013 Investment Climate Statement - Armenia” (U.S. Department of 
State 2013) U.S. Department of State also turns to the question of public procurement in 
Armenia, particularly to the tender processes. The report highlighted the existence of unfair 
tender procedures presented in the country and preferential treatment stating that the 
existing barriers are complicating the seemingly open legislative framework and Armenian 
Government’s visible effort in attracting foreign investment. These examples, in addition 
with the state’s failure in providing fair investigation of abuses have put under doubt the 
Government’s claims of equal treatment and transparency.  
In Armenia, the public procurement system seems to suffer from a perception of 
lack of transparency and integrity. The weaknesses in the public procurement system 
particularly in the area of integrity and transparency are a result of improper and weak 
framework, non-observance with norms, manipulation of the market, or as a result of 
malfeasance by key players. In the “Country Procurement Assessment Report” of the RA 
introduced by the World Bank from various reports are collected and presented the issues in 
the procurement system of Armenia which are related to: “weaknesses and overreliance on 
and abuse of restricted tendering (mainly sole sourcing); a lack of confidence in the 
independence and effectiveness of the complaint review mechanisms; numerous reports of 
poor quality of works and services and instances of non-delivery or non-performance; 
deficient rules on conflict of interest and codes of conduct; indications of anti-competitive 
agreement prior to submitting bids (eg. collusion); abuse of the qualification and evaluation 
process to favor pre-determined bidder; faulty specifications that favor certain suppliers; 
lack of significant participation and oversight by civil society groups and other 
stakeholders; deficient mechanisms for transparency, information access and feedback 
systems; unclear and overlapping audit systems with no significant follow-up of findings; 
lack of integration with overall national anti-corruption strategy and reference to the 
appropriate criminal legal framework; abuse of use of “monopoly” privileges; dismally low 
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level of tender participation; and general lack of capacity of procuring entities” (WB 2009, 
P 37-38).  
The existing barriers and difficulties for accessing information and the weak 
implementation of appropriate information systems and the obstacles in the freedom of 
information regimes are also factors hindering transparency.  
 
Informal Institutions in the Public Procurement Sector of Armenia 
 
There are many cases when ministries other than violating tender procedures, make 
purchases from only one organization, which in fact contains corruption risks, especially 
when those organizations are not chosen within tender procedures. This kind of violations 
in general leads to two main negative effects. Firstly, the state pays much higher prices than 
the real prices for the goods, labor and services that are being purchased for the country’s 
needs. And secondly, even when paying higher than the real price of the product, labor or 
service, the state does not get the outcome that was supposed initially, meaning that the 
state gets no result or partial or poor quality result.  
And another major problem that will be further elaborated is the negative effect of 
this kind of environment on investors. The problems and gaps in the public procurement 
sphere exist in almost all stages of planning, management, bargaining and enforcement 
processes. Another major problem is that this kind of attitude towards public procurement 
and tender processes in general hinder the rise of new actors, including the foreign ones. 
Corruption and political patronage through informal networking are the main barriers to 
free and fair tender processes. In the scope of this chapter some of the most apparent cases 
of violations in the public purchase sphere will be discussed.   
Particularly one of the government procurement cases made by Compulsory 
Enforcement Service of the Ministry of Justice of RA (JACES) is worth to mention. JACES 
as a client has bought a large number of Chinese BYD cars from a specific LTD. However, 
it turns out that the client that is JACES on behalf of the chief of the JACES and the agent 
of the very LTD on behalf of its founder is the same person Mihran Poghosyan 
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(Systematic, Widespread Corruption 2013). In other words, a high level governmental 
official de facto bought those cars from himself by serving the state budget resources for 
the prosperity of his own business. Violations specifically in the procurement of cars are 
quite common in Armenia. For example, the Prosecutor General’s Office of the RA (PGO) 
is purchasing cars from the company belonging to the head of the PGO or the Police of the 
RA are purchasing cars from the firm belonging to the Vice Prime minister of the RA, if 
believing many publications made by the media during the last years (Public procurement 
of cars 2013). This actually demonstrate the division of the car importing companies among 
public agencies meaning that any new investor or representative of any other car company 
is pulled out of the game and has practically no opportunity to get engaged into public 
procurement processes.  
In the scope of public procurement it is also risky when the product or service is 
purchased from one company or individual, especially when that kind of agreements has a 
long term nature. Purchases from a single source are especially very common in the regions 
other than the capital of Armenia. Usually the public agencies explain their kind of 
behavior by pointing out that there were no other bids for tender, however the studies have 
revealed many cases when that single source purchases were realized using a company that 
has been directly or indirectly affiliated with the official responsible for the public agency 
making that purchase.  
For instance, the administration of one of the regions of Armenia has made a single 
source purchase through a company that belongs to the brother of the head of that 
administration (Transparency International 2013). In a Vanadzor city, similar case was 
detected, when the municipality was making single source purchase, using a company that 
belongs to the mayor of that very city (Op. cit. Systematic, widespread corruption). What is 
more, in major tenders for single source procurement, are taking part and win such 
companies that even have no electronic data available including their contacts and 
description about their activity. Although informal networking helps these high ranked 
officials to avoid sanctions, in order to be more protected they generally used another 
scheme for biding too. The idea of this scheme is that an owner of several firms presents 
individual packages for every firm he owns for the participation in tender, by setting 
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different prices for the same activity. As a result, in any case the winning company belongs 
to him and what is more in official documents there will be clearly stated that de jure 
several firms where competing for the tender. These officials relying on corruption and on 
their networking feel themselves protected in the sense that no inspection will go deep 
enough or will be eager to go deep enough to reveal these violations.  
As a rule violations in the public procurement sphere are revealed through the 
investigations realized by more or less free media representatives or by international 
organizations acting in Armenia. However, even when such violations are discovered by 
media or international organizations, it is very rare when anyone is brought to justice, 
including the officials mentioned earlier in this paragraph. Here becomes obvious another 
significant problem that hinder foreign investment, which is the weak rule of law. 
Another case is the fuel supply to farms and farmers by the state. During 2012 the 
State Government in the framework of the assistance to farmers program has allocated to 
them more than AMD 620 million subsidy for a fuel purchase. In 2013 this subsidy was 
equal to almost AMD 595million. Thus during these 2 years the overall amount of the 
subsidy was nearly AMD 1.2 billion. However, this subsidy was not provided to the 
farmers for instance through some special coupons, rather it is delivered to a single 
particular fuel supplier (Op. cit. Systematic, widespread Corruption). It is obvious, that the 
plan used by the Government for farmers subsidizing is strengthening the positions of a 
specific supplier in a market, gives him an illegitimate advantages over both the other 
suppliers acting in the market and the possible new competitors. Those advantages not only 
foster that very company’s enrichment at the expense of the state budget but also strengthen 
the monopolistic position of the company, increase the prices related to it and inhibit the 
economic development even more. In such environment it is hardly possible to compete 
with this kind of suppliers. In general, Armenian market is very small and limited due to a 
small number of population and thus consumers. And this kind of advantages that are 
illegally given to some particular suppliers make almost impossible for any other especially 
foreign actors to operate in the same field. The amount of subsidy mentioned earlier is a 
huge “assistance” to that firm and the very firm having such a big demand can just by 
decreasing the prices on the fuel for a while oust any newcomer from the market.  
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Transaction Cost in the Public Procurement Sector of Armenia 
 
The foreign investor after the investigation of the local market, after collecting the 
needed information will probably become aware about the “unwritten rules” of the market, 
as these barriers and the behavior of officials towards these barriers are so obvious and 
ubiquitous that the barriers the investor will face to will be visible already on the first stage 
of his activity. This means, that the investor’s behavior and future decisions particularly 
whether or not to enter into Armenian market is conditioned mostly by his readiness and 
willingness to pay bribes, or to pay some constant percentage from the future profit or to 
use other means to get patronage from high level officials, which means to get engaged in a 
corruption process.  
As discussed through the theory the corrupt practices will yield additional costs to 
investor which means that the investor will have higher transaction costs. In the public 
procurement sector of Armenia the increase in transaction costs is more visible during the 
bargaining process that is when the investor needs to spend money on bribes as well as 
spend more time and efforts to sign an agreement that will allow him to supply the public 
organizations. But it is not fact that it will be always possible to get market access for a 
foreign investor through informal channels as people acting in that way are linked tightly 
among each other for a long period of time and not in every sphere there will be market 
access or the transaction costs – the price to be paid for entering the market – may be so 
high that it will be financially not efficient to act in the framework of such conditions.  
What is more, as in many other cases in order to be considered or chosen as a 
winner of a tender the firm should take into consideration the personal interests of the 
decision makers that is the officials. Taking into account the cases demonstrated earlier 
related to the public procurement sector of the country, it again becomes obvious the 
corrupt system which again enriches the corrupt politicians from the one side and increase 
the transaction costs of the entrepreneur from the other side. 
In many public purchase cases and in the mentioned cases particularly related to 
public procurement of cars, it should be taken into consideration that other than the 
corruption processes that increase the transaction costs, there are also presented political 
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risks which as noted by Harms and Ursprung (2002) decrease the level of inward 
investment. Although the suppliers of the state organizations in general serve for a long 
term, from time to time these suppliers are subject to change as a result of political changes 
which lead to changes in the office of the head of this or that state organization. However, 
even during that time the supplying companies that are coming as an alternative to the 
previous ones as a rule, are not chosen in a fair tender processes either. This means that any 
car importing company that would like to be a supplier of any public organization should 
take into account not only the corruption risks but also the political risks as the decisive 
factor in determining the start and end of cooperation with public agencies, rather than the 
quality and prices of the products supplied. 
Even if for instance the foreign company wins a tender and serves for this or that 
public agency, due to the weak rule of law the firm should spend money to be sure the other 
party sticks to the terms and conditions of the agreement. These costs are also considered as 
transaction costs (Dahlman, Carl J. 1979).  And the company should take appropriate 
actions whenever violations are revealed, which means again to spend money this time for 
enforcing the other side to stick to the terms. These actions in general assume acting 
through legal system. As stated Krueger (1974) mentions when the quality of institutions is 
low, the legal system also works with low effectiveness and in such situations the 
regulatory burden in the hands of bureaucrats operates as revenue seeking tool acting 
through red tape and other harassment tools. This in the end leads to a corrupt practices and 
again increases the transaction costs of the investor. 
However, here from the one side there is a weak legal system of Armenia with a 
weak rule of law and what is more from the other side there is a party on behalf of a state 
agency. Here if the violations by the state agency arise it is extremely difficult to achieve 
justice using the biased courts that are tightly linked with other state organizations in the 
scope of informal networking. And again if the foreign firm wants to continue its 
functioning and needs to overcome the created barriers needs to spend money on sticking 
the other party to the terms that is to have higher transaction costs that would not exist if the 




Taking this into account the case studies related to the public procurement sector, 
the operation of informal institutions there, and their affect and control on the sector the 
entrepreneur that is eager to provide services to state organizations or act in a field where 
some specific company enjoys the state’s sponsorship, like in the fuel consumption case, 
the newcomer should in advance ensure him with at least some fixed demand of his 
services or products which can be done by signing agreements and contracts with the state 
organizations. Here we come to the thing from which we have started that is from case 
studies it becomes obvious that in order to become an agent for a public procurement 
organization in Armenia it is essential to consider high transaction costs that arise merely 























CHAPTER 3. ANALYSIS OF THE INTERVIEWS 
 
In this chapter the data acquired through structured interviews is analyzed. The 
analysis takes into account the theory and methodology of the thesis when responding to 
the research questions and hypothesis. Particularly the Russia’s investments to Armenia are 
discussed in the context of the importance of country of origin of foreign investments as 
highlighted by Fortanier (2007). The country of origin of the foreign investment is one of 
the factors affecting the form of foreign investments which has a great importance for the 
host economy (Mencinger 2003), particularly whether or not the investments tend to market 
concentrations which in their turn rise barriers for other investors overcoming of which lead 
to increase in transaction costs. The questions to interviewees are elaborated further. 
1) Is there observed a tendency of market concentration, monopolization in Armenia 
by Russia’s investments? 
The 7 out of 9 respondents have pointed out that there is a clear tendency of the 
major investments from Russia into Armenian economy that tend to monopolize the sector 
of economy where they are going to function and act. This is firstly conditioned with the 
will to get super profits and depending on the sector of economy the monopolization of the 
environment can be also used in order to deepen the dependency of Armenia from Russia.  
The sectors that have been mentioned by the respondents as the ones where there is a high 
concentration of the market by Russian companies include energy sector, transport and 
communication sector and manufacturing sector. Russia is the sole owner of the national 
railway network of Armenia (South Caucasus Railway 2014), 2 of the 3 telecommunication 
companies are fully or partially owned by Russian firms (“Beeline Armenia” and “VivaCell 
Mts”) and other than the earlier stated facts about energy sector of Armenia it worth to 
mention that Russia owned all of Armenia’s hydroelectric and nuclear power stations with 
the exception of two (K. Sargsyan 2014).  
The respondent Mr. Karen Pashayan has also noted that the tendency of 
monopolizing different sectors of Armenian economy by Russian firms and companies 
through investments is being continued. And as a particular example is mentioned the 
inclusion of Armenia into Customs Union one of the main economic goals of which as Mr. 
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Pashayan believes is even more concentrating and monopolizing the Armenian market by 
Russian entities.  
The other 2 respondents believe that the entry of Russian investments as well as any 
other investment coming from any other country is stimulating higher competition rates and 
have indicated to see no monopolization of the environment by Russian firms, however, 
they agree in a way that there are sectors of economy in Armenia where Russia owned or 
Russian companies have dominant positions. 
2) What are the main reasons for the existence of Russian companies in Armenia that 
have dominant positions in the state’s economy?  
Here, all of the respondents agree at least with the point that there are Russian firms 
that possess dominant positions in different sectors of Armenian economy. However, the 
reasons of the existence of these firms vary from respondent to respondent. However, the 
answers of the respondents can be divided into two groups – the answers in the first group 
indicate this kind of reality as an outcome of many factors mostly negatively influencing 
Armenian investment market and institutional background and the answers in the second 
group state the existence of sectors dominated by Russian firms as a positive factor for 
Armenia.  
Here the majority of respondents belong to the first group, who have pointed that it 
is the outcome of pressures by Russia on Armenia, corrupt practices, informal networking, 
personal interests of high level officials of Armenia that lead to an environment where 
monopolies and/or dominant position possessing Russian firms operate. In addition, the 
improper enforcement of competition law is mentioned as another factor fostering the rise 
of such companies. Although the function of such companies is being ensured through legal 
acts or formal institutions, the ways this kind of agreements are reached are not rising from 
the idea of productivity for Armenian economy.  
For instance, taking into account the highly disputable results of presidential 
elections of Armenia (A. ISHKANIAN 2008) that officially have been won by Serzh 
Sargsyan, today the main foreign support force for Mr. Sargsyan personally is Russia on 
behalf of Kremlin. This leads to the fact that in order not to lose this support – thus his 
presidential position – the President of Armenia formally secures the undertakings and big 
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investments of Russia in Armenia through legal agreements, like for instance giving them 
exclusive rights to act in some particular sectors. This can be considered as a place where 
personal interests of individual affect the monopolization of Armenian economy by Russian 
firms. In this context it is important sot refer to Doytch and Eren (2012) who indicate that 
the democratization process can also have a negative effect on FDI, if foreign investors are 
in the position of receiving better incentives from autocratic regimes than from 
democracies. This is how Russia benefits from the failures in the democratization process 
of Armenia. 
It is also the pressure of Russia on Armenia that may lead to the monopolization of 
Armenian market. One of the most significant factors that are used by Russia for having a 
pressure on Armenia is the fact of being Armenia’s chief security supplier. Taking into 
consideration the unresolved conflict of Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno Kharabakh 
as well as other elements that make the region sensitive to military actions it becomes 
obvious that any security blackmail used by Russia against Armenia can hardly be resisted 
by Armenia. Many believe that Armenia’s choice to join Customs Union is also the 
outcome of the security blackmail and serious pressures by Russia. And as stated earlier 
one of the respondents strongly believe that one of the economic missions of Customs 
Union related to Armenia is monopolizing the Armenian economic market.  
However, few of the respondents suppose that the dominant positions of Russia 
owned or Russian companies in Armenia is conditioned with the high productivity of these 
companies, low prices of their services or products, or the innovative approaches used by 
them. It has been also mentioned that the dominant positions acquired by these firms is the 
result of the absence or weak interest of domestic firms to operate in the same particular 
field.   
3) Is the problem with high shares of monopolies in Armenian economic market more 
conditioned with the gaps in the law itself or with not proper enforcement of the 
law? 
Surprisingly or not all the responses to this question in this or that way suggest the 
idea that although the competition law in Armenia is not ideal and some gaps exist there, it 
is of far greater importance that the law is not enforced properly. The improper 
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enforcement of the competition law in its turn leads to monopolization of the environment 
and low level of competition. The proper enforcement of the law in its present condition 
will hinder the concentration of the market as the respondents believe.  
The weak rule of law in Armenia that gives possibility for the enforcement of 
competition law only case by case bases is a significant factor that let the monopolization 
of the economic environment. Both the domestic and foreign investment, including the 
investment inflows coming from Russia to Armenia would not lead to concentrations or 
monopolizations of the economic market of Armenia if the competition law is appropriately 
used.  
As Mathias (2005) mentioned, in the absence of competition law or in case of 
violating this law there will be no “lever” for the government to exercise this policy when it 
is needed. In Armenia’s case the problem is the violation of the law as indicated by the 
majority of the respondents the gap is not in the existence of the law but in the proper 
enforcement. This lead to a situation where the government of Armenia does not using the 
levers that are legally stated through the competition law, which lead to the monopolization 
of the market.  
It can be inferred from the mentioned that the investor should take into account the 
weak rule of law, thus be ready to spend money to stick the other company to terms of the 
competition law if the one is violating them. If there would be a strong rule of law in 
Armenia the competition law would be enforced without the actions of individual investors 
in the legal system of the country in order to defend their interests, rather any violations in 
the scope of competition law would have been prevented by the competent authorities. 
However, in this reality due to the weak rule of law, the investor as was already said may 
be forced to stick the other party to the competition law by spending some money, meaning 
having increased transaction costs that otherwise would not occur. 
4) Do Russia’s investments into Armenian economy hinder domestic and other foreign 
investment inflows to Armenia? 
6 out of the 9 respondents have indicated that the way Russia’s investment inflows 
to Armenia are actualized today is fostering the rise of the barriers for other investors. 
Firstly, due to the goals and missions of the Russia’s investments, concentration of the 
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market occurs after Russia companies are investing in Armenian economic environment. 
This becomes possible through the usage of various levers concentrated on the hands of 
Russia. Concentrated economic environment decrease the attractiveness of the market for 
any other investor, thus negatively affecting the investment climate of the country. 
Due to the patronage by Armenia even if some specific Russian company does not 
possess an exclusive right to operate in this or that sphere, usually it is of great efforts and 
expenditures to any other investor to act in the same sector and to become a competitor. 
Many artificial barriers may be raised by the officials till the new investor will be pulled out 
from the market or will try to secure the interests of these high ranked officials. This again 
means that the investor will be mostly obliged to pay bribes in order to stay and operate in 
the market. However, the bribery will increase the transaction costs of the investor and it is 
obvious that an environment with high transaction costs will most probably impede the 
investment levels.  
However, the other 3 respondents have highlighted that investments from Russia 
has no role in stimulating barriers in the investment market of Armenia or raising barriers 
for investments from countries other than Russia. They have pointed out that the existence 
of the institutional barriers that hinder foreign investments into Armenian economic market 
is solely the outcome of the inefficient state regulation of the country.  
While the majority of the interviewees stated that in a broad sense Russia has a 
negative role in the functioning of institutions in Armenia, the others find no Russia’s 
influence in the existence, formation or stimulation of institutional barriers to investment 
market of Armenia. However, the interviewees who support the idea that Russia plays no 
role in stimulating institutional barriers in Armenia has an important congeniality in the 
way that they all represent either Armenian governmental organizations which has strict 
pro-Russian attitude or have leading position in the organizations sponsored by Russia. The 
study believes that the answers of these interviewees have subjective bases rather than 
objective ones meaning that these responds should be considered as biased. 
The data collected through interviews and analysis of this data lead to the outcome 
where the role of Russian investment into Armenian market in stimulating the barriers for 
other entries into the same market becomes obvious. The answers of the respondents give 
61 
 
opportunity to believe that the investment inflows from Russia to Armenia tend to 
concentrate and monopolize the market using already noted levers, thus fostering the rise of 
the barriers for other investors when investing into the same sector of economy of Armenia.  
Particularly, in order to act in a sector where Russian company enjoys full or partial 
patronage by Armenian Government or powerful informal networks of Armenia, the 
newcomer is put in a situation where the way to start operating in the market is possible by 
securing the interests of these networks. This in its turn put the investor in a situation where 
if willing to start its activity the investor is being engaged in corrupt practices, which as 
was mentioned increases the transaction costs of the investor.  
From the other side, if Russian firm enters into this or that sector of Armenian 
economy where various companies already act and try to monopolize the sector mostly by 
violating the competition law, due to the weak rule of law of Armenia and patronage of 
Russian firms by government of Armenia mostly the other companies are not being 
protected by the competent authorities. These firms by spending money and time with 
using the expensive legal environment or by engaging in corrupt practices try to protect 
their rights. In both ways these lead to an increase in transaction costs of the entrepreneur. 
And the increase in transaction costs lead to a decrease in the levels of investments coming 
















In this thesis the institutional barriers to investment climate of Armenia and their 
role in the level of investment inflows to Armenia is studied. The main theoretical 
argument of this study is that the functioning of both formal and informal institutions of 
Armenia affects the transaction costs of the investors which as demonstrated through the 
theory in its turn has a significant impact on the level of investment inflows. Whether or not 
the operation of Armenian institutions increases the transaction costs is analyzed through 
the case studies covering 3 sectors of Armenian economy. Another theoretical argument of 
the paper is that the country of origin of foreign investment matters as depending on it the 
investment inflows may lead to concentrations in the host economy, where the entrance for 
other investments will be limited and the overcoming of that kind of problems will in its 
turn lead to an increase in transaction costs of other investors. In this sense the investment 
inflows to Armenia from Russia is studied through the primary data acquired from the 
interviews.  
The specificity of Armenian institutional background particularly high level of 
corruption, negative effects of informal networks, weak rule of law, state patronage and 
monopolized environment form the investment climate of the country. In this sense the 
usage of institutional analysis is important as it looks beyond the macroeconomic figures, 
particularly demonstrating that the increase of foreign investments is not always beneficial 
for the host economy due to weak institutional background of the country. Specifically the 
most flagrant cases have been studied to highlight that the gaps and failures in the work of 
institutions and insufficient institutional changes in Armenia makes the investment climate 
in the country unfriendly and unfavorable for investors or at least for those investors who 
do not possess some kind of patronage thus hindering the rise of the overall investment 
levels of the state.  
This study concludes that the informal networks of Armenia which are highly 
discussed in the scope of this study are functioning for securing their interests which in 
general negatively affect the investment climate of the country. Particularly, the 
concentration of the market by the companies belonging to the powerful members of these 
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informal networks or to the companies which are acting under the patronage of these 
informal networks lead to an environment where any new investor should secure the 
interests of these informal networks in order to be able to act in the same environment. By 
ensuring these interests the investor spends additional resources meaning having higher 
transaction costs.  
This study also concludes that there are also decisions adopted by the government 
of Armenia the adoption of which hinders the investment opportunities of others. 
Particularly in the case study of the Energy Sector of Armenia is discussed the adoption of 
an intergovernmental contract between Armenia and Russia which as this study believes 
increases the transaction costs of another party specifically Iran for acting in the 
environment. 
The analysis on Russia’s role has been further elaborated through the analysis of the 
data obtained from the interviews. While the majority of the interviewees stated that in a 
broad sense Russia has a negative role in the functioning of institutions in Armenia, the 
others find no Russia’s influence in the existence, formation or stimulation of institutional 
barriers to investment market of Armenia. However, as already stated, the interviewees 
who support the idea that Russia plays no role in stimulating institutional barriers in 
Armenia has an important congeniality in the way that they all represent either Armenian 
governmental organizations which has strict Pro-Russian attitude or have leading positions 
in the organizations sponsored by Russia. The study believes that the answers of these 
interviewees have subjective bases rather than objective ones meaning that these responds 
are biased and cannot be admitted as given and concludes that Russia plays a negative role 
in the functioning of various institutions in Armenia, and stimulates the rise of new barriers 
or strengthen already existed barriers in the investment market of Armenia particularly 
through concentration and monopolization of the market, which lead to an environment 
where the new investor needs higher transaction costs for acting in the field. 
The study throughout literature review has demonstrated that the increase in 
transaction costs negatively affect the levels of the investment inflows to the host economy. 
Taking into account this key factor, the study concludes that the function of the informal 
networks of Armenia, particular contracts securing dominant positions of specific firms 
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adopted by the government of Armenia negatively affect the institutional climate of 
Armenia as this factors increase the transaction costs of the other investors. What is more, 
the study concludes that Russia has a negative role in the investment climate of Armenia, as 
the investments coming from Russia tend to market concentrations which lead to an 
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Appendix 1. Index of Economic Freedom 2014 
 
What is economic freedom? 
Economic freedom is the fundamental right of every human to control his or her 
own labor and property. In an economically free society, individuals are free to work, 
produce, consume, and invest in any way they please. In economically free societies, 
governments allow labor, capital and goods to move freely, and refrain from coercion or 
constraint of liberty beyond the extent necessary to protect and maintain liberty itself. 
 
How is measured economic freedom? 
The economic freedom is measure based on 10 quantitative and qualitative factors, 
grouped into four broad categories, or pillars, of economic freedom: 
Rule of Law (property rights, freedom from corruption);  
Limited Government (fiscal freedom, government spending); 
Regulatory Efficiency (business freedom, labor freedom, monetary freedom); and 
Open Markets (trade freedom, investment freedom, financial freedom). 
Each of the ten economic freedoms within these categories is graded on a scale of 0 to 100. 
A country’s overall score is derived by averaging these ten economic freedoms, with equal 
weight being given to each.  
 
Which components of economic freedom are most important? 
The Index of Economic Freedom considers every component equally important in 
achieving the positive benefits of economic freedom. Each freedom is weighted equally in 
determining country scores. Countries considering economic reforms may find significant 
opportunities for improving economic performance in those factors in which they score the 





What is the period of study? 
For the 2014, most data covers the second half of 2012 through the first half of 
2013. To the extent possible, the information considered for each factor was current as of 
June 30, 2013.It is important to understand that some factors are based on historical 
information. For example, the monetary policy factor is a 3-year weighted average rate of 
inflation from January 1, 2010, to December 31, 2012. 
 
How can the Index of Economic Freedom be used? 
The Index of Economic Freedom is a helpful tool for a variety of audiences, 
including academics, policymakers, journalist, students, teachers, and those in business and 
finance. The Index provides an objective tool for analyzing 186 economies throughout the 
world. Each country page is a resource for in-depth analysis of a country’s political and 
economic developments. Historical Index data can provide vital long-term insights. 
Furthermore, the 10 economic freedoms provide a comprehensive set of principles for those 




Appendix 2. Corruption Perceptions Index 2013 
 
What is the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)? 
The CPI scores and ranks countries/territories based on how corrupt a country’s 
public sector is perceived to be. It is a composite index, a combination of surveys and 
assessments of corruption, collected by a variety of reputable institutions. The CPI is the 
most widely used indicator of corruption worldwide. 
What is the difference between a country/territory’s rank and its score? 
A country/territory’s score indicates the perceived level of public sector corruption 
on a scale of 0-100, where 0 means that a country is perceived as highly corrupt and a 100 
means that a country is perceived as very clean. A country's rank indicates its position 
relative to the other countries/territories included in the index. Ranks can change merely if 
the number of countries included in the index changes. 
Is the country/territory with the lowest score the world’s most corrupt nation? 
No. The CPI is an indicator of perceptions of public sector corruption, i.e. 
administrative and political corruption. It is not a verdict on the levels of corruption of 
entire nations or societies, or of their policies, or the activities of their private sector. 
Citizens of those countries/territories that score at the lower end of the CPI often show the 
same concern about and condemnation of corruption as the public in countries that perform 
strongly. 
Further, the country/territory with the lowest score is the one where public sector 
corruption is perceived to be greatest among those included in the list. The CPI provides no 
information about countries/territories that are not included in the index. 
Can the score of a country in the 2013 Corruption Perceptions Index be compared 
with the previous year? 
Yes. As part of the update to the methodology used to calculate the CPI in 2012 we 
established the new scale of 0-100. Using this scale we can compare CPI scores from one 
year to the next. Because of the update in the methodology last year, however, CPI scores 
before 2012 are not comparable over time. 
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Appendix 3. Freedom in the World 2013 
 
Methodology Summary 
The Freedom in the World survey provides an annual evaluation of the progress and 
decline of freedom in 195 countries and 14 related and disputed territories. The survey, 
which includes both analytical reports and numerical ratings, measures freedom according 
to two broad categories: political rights and civil liberties. Political rights ratings are based 
on an evaluation of three subcategories: electoral process, political pluralism and 
participation, and functioning of government. Civil liberties ratings are based on an 
evaluation of four subcategories: freedom of expression and belief, associational and 
organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy and individual rights.  
Each country is assigned a numerical rating from 1 to 7 for both political rights and 
civil liberties, with 1 representing the most free and 7 the least free. The ratings are 
determined by the total number of points (up to 100) each country receives on 10 political 
rights questions and 15 civil liberties questions; countries receive 0 to 4 points on each 
question, with 0 representing the smallest degree and 4 the greatest degree of freedom. The 
average of the political rights and civil liberties ratings, known as the freedom rating, 
determines the overall status:  Free (1.0 to 2.5), Partly Free (3.0 to 5.0), or Not Free (5.5 to 
7.0). Freedom House also assigns upward or downward trend arrows to countries which 
saw general positive or negative trends during the year that were not significant enough to 
result in a ratings change. The survey assigns the designation of electoral democracy to 
countries that have met certain minimum standards. The numerical benchmark for a 
country to be listed as an electoral democracy is a total of 7 points or more (out of a 
possible 12) for the 3 political rights subcategory questions on electoral process, as well as 
a total of 20 points or more (out of a possible 40) for all 10 political rights questions. 
Freedom House does not maintain a culture-bound view of freedom. The 
methodology of the survey is grounded in basic standards of political rights and civil 
liberties, derived in large measure from relevant portions of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. These standards apply to all countries and territories, irrespective of 
geographical location, ethnic or religious composition, or level of economic development. 
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The survey does not rate governments or government performance per se, but rather the 
real-world rights and freedoms enjoyed by individuals. Freedoms can be affected by state 
actions as well as by non state actors, including insurgents and other armed groups. 
The findings are reached after a multilayered process of analysis and evaluation by 
a team of in-house and consultant regional experts and scholars. The survey, which has 
been published since 1972, enables an examination of trends in freedom over time and on a 
comparative basis across regions with different political and economic systems. Freedom in 
the World’s ratings and narrative reports are used by policymakers, leading scholars, the 


















Appendix 4 .Names, Positions and Academic Degree of Interviewees 
 
Name, Surname Former or Present Position Academic Degree 
Alexander Arzumanyan Member of National Assembly 
of Armenia, Former Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of RA (1996-
1998) 
 
Bagrat Asatryan Lecturer at Yerevan State 
University, Former President of 
the Central Bank of RA (1994-
1998) 
PHD in Economics 
Edward Sandoyan Director of the Institute of 
Economics and Business at 
Armenian Russian Slavonic 
University, Former Minister of 
Finance and Economy of RA 
(1998-1999) 
Doctor of Economics, 
Professor 
Grigor Kirakosyan Adviser to the Rector at 
Armenian State University of 
Economics 
Doctor  of  Economics, 
Professor 
Karen Pashayan Lecturer at Yerevan State 
University of Economics 
PHD in Economics 
Stepan Mnatsakanyan President of the National 
Statistical Service of RA 
PHD in Economics, Docent 
Tatoul Manasserian Founder and Director of the 
Research Center 
“ALTERNATIVE” 
Doctor of Science in 
Economics, Professor 
Vahagn Khachatryan Former Mayor of Yerevan 
(1992 to 1996) 
Economist 
Vahe Mikaelyan Vice Dean of the Finance 
Department at Armenian State 
University of Economics 
PHD in Economics, Docent 
 
